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REVISIONIST MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 
Avidan Y. Cover* 
The current constitutional torts system under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 affords 
little relief to victims of government wrongdoing. Victims of police brutality 
seeking accountability and compensation from local police departments find 
their remedies severely limited because the municipal liability doctrine 
demands plaintiffs meet near-impossible standards of proof relating to 
policies and causation. 
 
The article provides a revisionist historical account of the Supreme 
Court’s municipal liability doctrine’s origins. Most private litigants’ claims 
for damages against cities or police departments do not implicate the 
doctrine’s early federalism concerns over protracted federal judicial 
interference with local governance. Meanwhile the federal government 
imposes extensive reforms on local police departments through the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The resulting 
system of bifurcated municipal liability for police misconduct ignores history. 
It permits government-initiated systemic, injunctive relief claims to flow 
readily, but effectively bans individual victims’ discrete damages claims.  
 
The article proposes making it easier to sue local governments for police 
brutality. Reducing the standard for damages relief does not offend 
federalism principles and realizes objectives critical to the constitutional 
remedial system: compensation, trust, vindication of rights, and appropriate 
assignment of responsibility. The article proposes a remedial scheme 
authorizing civil actions for police brutality victims against local 
governments for (1) a pattern or practice of local government police 
misconduct, and (2) isolated instances where a local police department lacks 
a policy, of which there is national consensus by other local departments that 
the policy is necessary to prevent a particular constitutional harm. The 
proposal also expands the potential for individual officer liability when the 
local police department has a specific policy in place aimed at preventing 
wrongdoing that the officer ignores. 
 
Municipal liability is practically a dead letter. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area is two-faced at best. In one breath, the Court invokes the availability of a remedy for holding 
local governments accountable for unconstitutional conduct like systemic police brutality, while 
constructing standards so impossibly high that rarely, if ever, may an aggrieved person establish 
municipal liability. It has been almost thirty years since the Court found that a local “policy caused 
an unconstitutional violation.”1 This anemic municipal liability frustrates the Court’s purported 
                                                   
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. My grateful thanks to the Southeastern 
Association of Law Schools New Scholars Workshop participants and University of Pittsburgh School of Law Junior 
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balancing of the protection of individual constitutional rights—through compensation and 
deterrence of misconduct—and the guardianship of local autonomy.2 Moreover, the doctrine is 
part of a parsimonious constitutional tort adjudication system that, through qualified immunity, 
also generally denies police brutality victims a remedy against government employees.3  
Because the bulk of people’s encounters with law enforcement involve local officers, the 
limited civil remedy against local governments and their agents is particularly troubling.4 Most 
members of the public have little occasion to defensively invoke constitutional protections by, for 
example, suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence.5 People also will rarely seek prospective 
relief, enjoining police from a particular offensive practice.6 An expanded conception of municipal 
liability, which also significantly truncates the interrelated qualified immunity doctrine, is 
therefore required so that police brutality victims may obtain the chief constitutional civil 
remedy—damages.  
Though proposals to reform police practices abound, there has been little focus on the 
singular importance of securing compensation.7 Current municipal liability doctrine does not 
distinguish forms of relief, precluding damages claims based on reasoning that, I argue, draws on 
inapposite concerns over equitable remedies entangling federal courts in local governance. 
                                                   
Faculty workshop participants for their comments on drafts of this paper. My particular thanks to Lauryn Gouldin and 
David A. Harris for their helpful insights. 
1 Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 414 (2016). 
2 See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). 
3 See generally Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLORIDA L. REV. 1773 (2016) 
(describing how qualified immunity doctrine and excessive force case law work together to limit § 1983 remedy). The 
various other constitutional torts doctrines all favor government actors as well. Sovereign immunity insulates state 
governments from damages liability for constitutional violations. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See also Will 
v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “person” in § 1983 does not include states and 
state agencies). And judicially crafted causes of action afford meager accountability for individual federal law 
enforcement officers’ constitutional wrongdoing. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843 (2017). The Supreme Court’s 
rigorous pleadings standards further discourage productive effective civil actions against government actors. Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
4 Though other forms of government misconduct also may merit changes to government immunity law, police brutality 
uniquely justifies expansion of local government liability because of the public’s frequent, often involuntary, and 
physical interactions with officers that may merge into harassment, profiling, searches, seizure, and violence. See 
LYNN LANGDON & MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR 
DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 1 (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf 
(accessed Aug. 13, 2017) (finding that 62.9 million U.S. residents, 16 years or older, had at least one contact with 
police in 2011, and that half of those people had an involuntary experience with police). 
5 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring); Michael Wells, Civil Recourse, Damages-As-Redress, and Constitutional Torts, 46 GA. L. REV. 1003, 
1051 (2012). 
6 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring); Wells, supra note 5, at 1051. 
7 See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT (2017) 
(addressing important areas including openly discussing the country’s violent racial past, reforming racial disparities 
in sentencing, policing of black males, ending racial profiling, implicit bias instruction, improving police and 
community relations, and prosecutorial and grand jury reforms); FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 
21ST CENTURY POLICING, May 2015, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf (describing 
need for changes in policies and procedures due to fatal police shootings throughout the country); infra Part II 
(discussing police structural reform litigation proposals relating to 42 U.S.C. § 14141). 
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A textbook account might draw the birth and evolution of municipal liability in linear 
fashion. But like any good origins story, the details are murkier. The Court first disavowed 
municipal liability in 1971 based on its reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1983’s legislative history in Monroe 
v. Pape.8 Only seventeen years later, the Court reversed itself in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
offering a wholly different reading of the legislative history.9 Yet in breathing life into municipal 
liability, Monell reflects much ambivalence about the remedy. 
Although the Monell Court upheld a municipal liability claim, it added the caveats that a 
constitutional violation must be tied to a policy or custom and that liability does not attach through 
respondeat superior. The subsequent near-four decades have seen evolution and refinement of 
these caveats, which tend to limit municipal liability though stringent causation and culpability 
standards. In particular, plaintiffs must establish that a municipality’s “deliberate action . . . is the 
‘moving force’” causing the deprivation of federal rights.10 Plaintiffs also must demonstrate that a 
municipality acted with deliberate indifference to a “plainly obvious” risk that its action will 
violate the federal right at issue.11 
Commentators and the Court have generally attributed Monell’s parsimonious municipal 
liability bent to a concern for federalism that is easily traced back to the Monroe to Monell to post-
Monell progeny line. In its invocation of federalism, the Court also stresses the negative financial 
effects that the damages from an expansive municipal liability would visit on local governments.  
This article’s revisionist historical approach, however, reveals that the above narrative is 
falsely circumscribed.12 The prevailing narrative ignores the Court’s earlier concerns over 
structural reform litigation and civil rights injunctions that were at issue in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Under a revisionist analysis, today’s municipal liability doctrine may be better explained by the 
Court’s unspoken and sublimated anxieties over impact litigation that sought systematic reforms 
under federal judicial supervision.  
Most lawsuits asserting municipal liability are more modest in their aims, often seeking 
only damages or discrete equitable relief, rather than institutional upheaval. These limited actions 
serve the vital purpose of compensating victims of unconstitutional municipal policies, practices, 
and customs. Permitting the public to bring more constitutional tort damages claims against local 
governments also supports principles of procedural justice13 and civil recourse14, empowering 
community members, vindicating constitutional rights against wrongdoers, and fostering trust in 
courts’ fairness.  
                                                   
8 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). 
9 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
10 Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 
11 Id. at 411. 
12 By using the term “revisionist,” I engage here in what Arthur Schlesinger describes as “a readiness to challenge 
official explanations.” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 165 (1986).  
13 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE 283, 292-
94 (2003). 
14 See Wells, supra note 5, at 1011-13. See also Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, __ U. CHI. L. FORUM 
437, 471-72 (2016) (discussing importance of increasing plaintiffs’ leverage and motivation for suing police and 
obtaining reforms through reduction of barriers to police liability) [hereinafter Schwartz, Who Can Sue the Police?]. 
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It is specifically these more modest damages claims that should not be essentially barred 
on the same federalism grounds that are animated by systematic structural reform litigation efforts. 
These damages actions do not implicate the same federalism concerns. 
Failing to appreciate the animating rationales of municipal liability can lead to anomalous 
legal remedial schemes. The current judicial and statutory framework for addressing police 
brutality offers a useful example. The decline of municipal liability as an avenue for limited 
judicial relief from police brutality led, in part, to a surge in structural reform litigation and police 
reform spurred by the federal executive via its congressionally-created 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
authority.  
These reforms have led to welcome and significant improvements in police training, use of 
force, and accountability in several police departments across the nation. But resource constraints 
and political considerations often limit the scope of reform. Moreover, parties involved in § 14141 
litigation often fail to sufficiently engage the local community—particularly police misconduct 
victims—in the reform process. Finally, § 14141 is solely prospective in its remedial reach, 
affording no compensation to victims of police brutality. 
Despite the limited ambit of § 14141 structural reform litigation, the inevitably intrusive 
nature of these actions stands in stark contrast to the banner of federalism that the Court has 
invoked for some forty years in rejecting various individual lawsuits asserting municipal liability. 
To be sure, Congress granted the federal executive the authority to intercede in light of the Court’s 
skepticism of judicially authorized institutional litigation and reforms. But the authority would 
appear to contravene the Court’s concern over federal intrusion on local law enforcement 
prerogatives. This article addresses whether the principles of federalism would be less offended 
were individuals granted more fulsome damages remedies in the form of more expansive 
municipal liability.  
Moreover, ensuring municipal liability’s vitality is particularly necessary in any era where 
the federal executive is not inclined to pursue § 14141 actions. The Trump administration has, for 
example, indicated it will not pursue litigation against local police agencies for excessive force 
and other constitutional violations, suggesting it may even undo consent decrees entered pursuant 
to § 14141.15 Where police department accountability may so readily become a casualty of 
politicization, the individual damages lawsuit should not be so easily precluded by restrictive 
judicially imposed standards resting on an inapposite federalism rationale. 
                                                   
15 Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions’s memo to Justice Department officials suggests that the federal government’s 
local law enforcement reform efforts may cease with the Trump administration, owing to some of these very 
federalism concerns. Memo from Att’y Gen. Jeffrey B. Sessions to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Re: 
Supporting Federal, State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement (March 31, 2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3535148/Consentdecreebaltimore.pdf, [hereinafter Sessions Memo]. 
Attorney General Sessions called for a review of local law enforcement reform efforts, including “existing or 
contemplated consent decrees” based, in part, on the principle that “[l]ocal control and local accountability are 
necessary for effective local policing. It is not the responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal law 
enforcement agencies.” Id. 
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Adopting a more contextualized—or revisionist—history of municipal liability, should 
liberate the Court to revisit its municipal liability jurisprudence. After all this is a mess that the 
Court has made. But the Court has proven so wedded to fending off attempts to secure 
compensatory damages for government wrongdoing that any hope for a more permissive 
municipal liability damages standard lies with the Legislative branch. To the Congress’ credit, it 
did, at least, address the Judiciary’s errors regarding equitable relief with its structural reform 
legislation. Now it should finish the job concerning damages liability. 
Part I of this article charts the origins of the Monell standard and revisits the legitimacy of 
the federalism concerns that purportedly animate the restrictive causation requirement for 
municipal liability under § 1983. Part II addresses one legislative effort—§ 14141—to address 
some of the Court’s jurisprudence that limited the public and the government’s efforts to secure 
police reforms. The section also explores the shortcomings in § 14141, particularly from a 
democratic and compensatory perspective, as well as the significant federalism issues the law 
raises.  
Part III argues that, because the Court’s federalism concerns were motivated by the 
invasive nature of prospective relief, damages claims merit a diminished standard of liability. The 
section lays out how the history and nature of damages relief also merit a lesser showing for 
municipal liability. The section further demonstrates that a more available damages remedy from 
local governments for police abuses will foster victim compensation, improve the public’s trust in 
the legal system, vindicate constitutional rights, and better affix responsibility for wrongdoing.  
Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative framework for assessing municipal liability claims 
seeking only damages relief. The remedial scheme authorizes two civil actions for police brutality 
victims against local governments for (1) a pattern or practice of local government police 
misconduct, and (2) isolated instances where a local police department lacks a policy, of which 
there is national consensus by other local departments that the policy is necessary to prevent a 
particular constitutional harm. The proposal also expands potential individual officer liability 
when the local police department has a specific policy in place aimed at preventing wrongdoing 
that the officer ignores. The section concludes by examining both the strengths and weaknesses of 
the proposed framework. 
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I. REVISING MONELL 
 
A. Monroe v. Pape 
 At the outset of the rebirth of § 1983 as a constitutional remedy in 1961, the Supreme 
Court’s resistance to municipal liability was distinguished by ostensible alarm over monetary 
damages’ debilitating financial impact on local governments. In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme 
Court addressed a § 1983 lawsuit alleging the abusive treatment by Chicago police officers, which 
sought damages against both the officers and the city of Chicago.16 The Court established for the 
first time that local government officials could be held liable for constitutional violations under § 
1983.17 Yet the Court also held that municipalities enjoy immunity from liability, reasoning that 
Congress had not intended municipalities to fall within the scope of § 1983.18  
The Court relied on the legislative history of the civil rights action precursor to § 1983. The 
Court construed the 42nd Congress’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment to the 1871 Ku Klux 
Klan Act, “which would have made ‘the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish’ in which certain 
acts of violence occurred liable ‘to pay full compensation’ to the person damaged or his widow or 
legal representative,”19 as “so antagonistic”20 to preclude a reading of “person” within § 1983 to 
include a municipal corporation.21  
Monroe might have been viewed—as its author, Justice William Douglas believed—as 
divining congressional intent to limit the costly and paralyzing effects of municipal liability for 
only damages relief.22 But the Court eventually held in 1973 in City of Kenosha v. Bruno that 
§ 1983 also prohibits claims for declaratory and equitable relief.23 The general bar on municipal 
liability would not, however, endure.  
B. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 
Seventeen years after Monroe, the Court overturned its holding as to municipal liability in 
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,24 reinterpreting the 1871 Act’s legislative history to permit lawsuits 
against local governments. The Court held that the plaintiffs in Monell were entitled to monetary 
relief in the form of retrospective back pay based on a New York City agency’s “official policy” 
requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leave.25 The Court set rigorous parameters for 
                                                   
16 365 U.S. at 169. 
17 Id. at 172. 
18 Id. at 187. 
19 Id. at 188. 
20 Id. at 191. 
21 Id. at 191-92. 
22 City of Kenosha, Wis. v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); id. at 517 (Appendix) 
(attributing the rejection of the Sherman Amendment to “the notion that civil liability for damages might destroy or 
paralyze local governments”). 
23 City of Kenosha, Wis. v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (holding that municipal corporations “are outside of [§ 
1983’s] ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages”). 
24 436 U.S. at 691. 
25 Id. at 661-62. Though the relief sought was monetary, the plaintiffs did not bring “a damage suit against the city 
itself, but instead an equitable action brought against particular officials in their official capacity asking them to use 
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establishing liability, however, including requiring that a constitutional violation be tied to a policy 
or custom and that a municipality could not be held vicariously liable for its employees’ conduct.26 
The Court’s decision can be viewed as startling, in part because it ran counter to principles 
of stare decisis. Monell also was a product of, and response to, the Court’s contradictory patchwork 
of recent cases upholding and striking down civil lawsuits seeking broad institutional reforms. It 
was a compromise. While purporting to authorize lawsuits against local governments, the 
standards it imposed reflected the Court’s ambivalence, if not (growing) hostility toward federal 
civil rights injunctions. 
Coinciding with the Warren Court era, impact litigation reaped a number of successes 
particularly in reforming school segregation and prison conditions.27 Expansive federal judicial 
decrees in the 1950s and 1960s required that “forward-looking, affirmative steps be taken to 
prevent future deprivations.”28 These cases generally involved intricate prospective remedies 
rather than simple damages. But over the next decade, structural reform through litigation received 
substantial criticism.29 The transition to the Burger Court saw a disenchantment with federal 
judicial supervision of local government functions and a scaling back and undoing of 
desegregation decrees and rejection of challenges to prison conditions.30 
It was into these cross-currents of the law that the Court confronted Monroe’s prohibition 
on municipal liability. Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion in Monell relied on a revised 
reading of legislative history to overturn the bar on municipal liability. Brennan’s revisionist 
legislative history was prompted by the Court’s irreconcilable holdings that Monroe and its 
progeny precluded municipal liability and that school boards could still be sued under § 1983.  
At stake was the Court’s post-Brown v. Board of Education desegregation project. In 
addition to citing “over a score of cases”31 that the Court decided on school board liability, which 
sat uncomfortably alongside Monroe,32 Brennan’s majority opinion interpreted congressional 
                                                   
their existing power to undo the wrong they had committed” David Jacks Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion: 
Justice Powell, Monell, and the Meaning of “Color of Law”, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 698-99 (2011) [hereinafter 
Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion]. 
26 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 
27 Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil 
Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1392 (2000) [hereinafter Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation]. 
28 Id. at 1392. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1995) (directing district courts to 
follow “equitable principles” in “fashioning and effectuating” desegregation decrees). 
29 Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
30 Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 27 at 1393-95. 
31 Monell, 436 U.S. at 663, 663 n.5. 
32 Id. at 695-96. See also id. at 696 (“Thus, while we have reaffirmed Monroe without further examination on three 
occasions, it can scarcely be said that Monroe is so consistent with the warp and woof of civil rights law as to be 
beyond question.”). 
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actions to reflect legislative approval of federal judicial supervision of local school districts with 
some costs payed by local governments.33  
In his concurrence, Justice Lewis Powell more explicitly characterized the school board 
and Monroe line of cases as impossibly inconsistent.34 Powell observed that the Court had not 
prohibited official-capacity school board cases that included damages claims, thereby implicitly 
recognizing municipal damages liability.35 He also rejected proposals that would bifurcate 
municipal liability based on the nature of the requested relief and thus permit only equitable claims 
under § 1983.36 Powell noted the Court’s rejection of such a dual approach in Kenosha.37 Finally, 
Powell argued that expansion of municipal liability under § 1983 was necessary or else the Court’s 
recent Bivens cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment might have to be broadened to 
encompass claims against local governments.38 
The Court’s ambivalence over municipal liability—particularly its potential for solidifying 
and increasing burdensome lawsuits and federal court supervision of local government agencies 
that had been ushered in with Brown—help explain the compromised nature of Monell and its 
policy and causation requirement. Indeed, the Court foreshadowed these concerns two years earlier 
in its 1976 opinion, Rizzo v. Goode, which struck down a court order requiring extensive 
Philadelphia police department reforms.39 Rizzo emphasized the sensitivity with which the Court 
regards federal injunctions against local government and demanded a direct causal link between a 
plan or policy and unconstitutional conduct.  
Even though the Monell plaintiffs only sought back pay for their unconstitutional 
department-imposed pregnancy leaves, the Court adopted the very same rules for establishing 
liability articulated in Rizzo.40 To better understand Monell, we must revisit Rizzo. 
C. Rizzo v. Goode 
                                                   
33 Id. at 696-99 (inferring legislative approval of municipal liability from, in part, Congress’ rejecting federal court 
stripping efforts, providing funds to assist school districts in complying with decrees, and authorizing civil rights 
attorney fees awards). 
34 Id. at 710-11 (Powell, J., concurring) (“This line of cases—from Monroe to Kenosha—is difficult to reconcile on a 
principled basis with a parallel series of cases in which the Court has assumed sub silentio that some local government 
entities could be sued under § 1983.”); id. at 711 (warning that maintaining Monroe’s holding would “cast . . . grave 
doubt” on Court’s § 1983 school board litigation). Both in dissent and in memorandums, Justice Rehnquist invoked 
stare decisis and disputed the inconsistency or “confusion” of Monroe and the school board cases, contending that the 
lines of cases have made clear the distinction. See 436 U.S. at 714-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Justice William H. 
Rehnquist, Memorandum to the Conference (Rough Draft), No. 76-1914, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 
7-9, March 6, 1978 
http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/monelldocs/LFP/Powell%2004%20Monell%20(LFP%20189-
F6%20PDF%20Files)/3-5-
78%20Draft%20Memo%20WHR%20to%20Conf%20(but%20delivered%20to%20LFP)%20LFP189F060011.pdf 
(accessed July 10, 2016). 
35 Monell, 436 U.S. at 711-12 (Powell, J., concurring). 
36 Id. at 712 (Powell, J., concurring). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 423 U.S. 362 (1961). 
40 See infra Part I.D. 
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Rizzo is not, formally, a municipal liability case.41 But the Rizzo litigation amounts to a 
municipal liability case in everything but name. Individuals and groups on behalf of all 
Philadelphia residents and black residents brought two consolidated class actions against the 
mayor, police commissioner, and other city officials.42 The suits sought equitable remedies based 
on a “pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers” targeting 
minorities but affecting all city residents.43 The Court characterized the claims against the city 
officials as alleging “express authorization or encouragement of [ ] mistreatment [and] failure to 
act in a manner so as to assure that it would not recur in the future.”44  
The trial concerned 40 incidents of alleged police misconduct, and entailed 21 days of 
hearings consisting of 250 witnesses.45 As relief, the district court ordered “‘a comprehensive 
program’” for addressing civilian complaints, subject to guidelines on revising police manuals of 
procedures concerning civilian interaction, including limits on racial bias, offensive language, and 
searches; complaint processing; forms; and adjudication of complaints.46  
The Supreme Court’s decision presaged Monell’s policy requirement for municipal 
liability. Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice William Rehnquist held the lower courts’ equitable 
relief improper, rejecting liability based on a pattern of misconduct by police officers because there 
was no showing of a causal link to the defendants’ actions, i.e., policies or plans.47 The Court 
distinguished the desegregation cases, Brown and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, in which school board members and administrators had been ordered to integrate 
schools because those officials had affirmatively denied equal protection to minority students.48  
The case came down to concerns over federalism and the scope of the federal courts’ 
equitable power. Indeed, the Rizzo opinion suggests that courts should be skeptical of claimants 
seeking equitable relief under § 1983.49 The case was in large measure about the role that courts 
should have in overseeing police department operations.50 Or, as the Court later phrased it, whether 
“[t]he scope of federal equity power . . . should be extended to the fashioning of prophylactic 
                                                   
41 To some extent, Rizzo was simply a supervisory liability case, in which the Court held that officials could not be 
held liable under § 1983 unless they actually directed the constitutional violation. 423 U.S. at 384 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court today appears to assert that a state official is not subject to the structures of 42 U.S.C. s 1983 
unless he directs the deprivation of constitutional rights.”). 
42 Id. at 364 n.1. 
43 Id. at 366-67. 
44 Id. at 367. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 369-70. 
47 Id. at 374 (contrasting with facts of Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 812, 814-
15 (1974)). The Court might have dispensed with the case on just one of the grounds that it raised in its opinion. For 
example, the Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the relief they sought was too “attenuated” 
given that they sought changes in police procedures and had not named the police officers who might act unlawfully 
against them due to inadequate guidance. 423 U.S. at 372. 
48 Id. 376-77 (discussing 402 U.S. 1 (1971); 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
49 See id. at 378 (“Section 1983 by its terms confers authority to grant equitable relief as well as damages, but its 
words ‘allow a suit in equity only when that is the proper proceeding for redress . . .’” (quoting Giles v. Harris, 189 
U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (Holmes, J.)). 
50 See id. at 369. 
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procedures for a state agency designed to minimize this kind of misconduct on the part of a handful 
of its employees.”51 The Court held that the injunctive relief requiring a revision of the police 
department’s manual on procedures relating to civilians “was indisputably a sharp limitation on 
the department’s ‘latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs.’”52 Focusing on the equitable 
nature of the relief, the Court stressed the need to consider federalism in weighing the propriety of 
the remedy.53 The Court ultimately held that the district court’s injunctive decree had “departed 
from these precepts” of federalism, which included restraining federal courts’ intrusion of their 
equitable powers into state administration of law.54 Dissenting, Justice Harry Blackmun agreed 
with the “abstract principle” that federal judicial involvement in local police operation is 
“undesirable”, but contended that § 1983 was intended to cover inaction leading to the violation 
of constitutional rights.55  
Just four years later in United States v. Philadelphia, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit rejected the federal government’s efforts to secure very similar reforms of the 
Philadelphia police department.56 Relying in part on federalism principles, the Third Circuit held 
that the United States lacked standing to pursue claims enjoining Philadelphia Police Department 
officials from systematic civil rights violations.57 Philadelphia residents no longer had a judicial 
remedy to stop their own police from brutalizing them. 
D. Revisiting Monell 
Monell’s policy requirement for municipal liability, insisting on a causal relationship 
between the constitutional violation and a municipal policy, relies almost entirely on Rizzo. The 
Court cites Rizzo for the proposition that liability hinges on causation and “that Congress did not 
intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent.”58 Brennan’s second draft of the 
opinion relies even more heavily on Rizzo, employing it to illustrate the principle that blame or 
fault of the local government must be demonstrated to fall within the scope of § 1983.59 In a draft 
                                                   
51 Id. at 378. 
52 Id. at 379 (citation omitted). 
53 Id. at 378 (“Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly 
mindful of the ‘special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between equitable power and State administration 
of its own law.’” (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951)). See id. at 379 (“[A]ppropriate consideration 
must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.”) (citing Doran 
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975)). 
54 Id. at 378, 379-80 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.  488, 502 (1974)). 
55 Id. at 381-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
56 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980). 
57 Id. 
58 436 U.S. at 692; see also id. at 694 (“By our decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 
561 (1976), we would appear to have decided that the mere right to control without any control or direction having 
been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability.”); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 
370-71 (“The plain words of [§ 1983] impose liability whether in the form of payment of redressive damages or being 
placed under an injunction only for conduct which ‘subjects, or causes to be subjected’ the complainant to a 
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.”). 
59 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, No. 75-1914, 2d Opinion Draft, William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Opinion, 33 n. 59 (April 24, 1978) (“For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), we recognized that fault 
is a crucial factor in determining whether relief may run against a party for its alleged participation in an 
unconstitutional tort.”), available at 
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footnote Brennan quotes at length the Rizzo Court’s distinguishing of the Swann and Brown’s 
school board roles in affirmatively directing unconstitutional conduct in the desegregation cases. 
In order to bring Justices on board, however, Brennan sought to avoid any appearance that 
negligence could establish municipal liability.60 Brennan therefore removed all references to 
“fault” throughout the opinion that would so imply, resulting in the removal of the entire footnote 
and quote from Rizzo. Though the Rizzo footnote was ultimately left on the printing floor, the 
opinion’s imprint on Monell and municipal liability is unmistakable. 
What has received little attention is that the Rizzo interpretation of § 1983, which Monell 
adopted, was predicated on a case involving systemic injunctive relief—federal court intervention 
in local policing efforts. In adopting the Rizzo test, Monell also adopted Rizzo’s reasoning, namely 
federalism concerns, interests that may not always be implicated by municipal liability claims 
limited to damages relief.61 
The holdings of Rizzo cannot be separated from the underlying facts of the case, and, in 
particular, the relief sought. The Rizzo majority formulated a rigorous causation standard for § 
1983 liability based on facts that, as it perceived them, involved very few allegations of 
misconduct, were not authorized or approved by defendants, and concerned a dispute between “the 
entire citizenry of Philadelphia and the petitioning elected and appointed officials” over police 
procedures.62 The sought-after-relief amounted to an “overhaul[ ]” of police policies and 
practices.63 
                                                   
http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/monelldocs/WJB/Brennan%2004%20Monell%20(CF%20I-437-
7%20PDF%20Files)/4-21-78%20Draft%20WJB%202d%20Opinion%20WJB437F70001.pdf. (accessed July 10, 
2016). 
60 Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr. to Lewis F. Powell, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 
No. 75-1914, May 2, 1978, available at 
http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/WJB/Brennan%2004%20Monell%20(CF%20I-437-
7%20PDF%20Files)/5-2-78%20Memo%20WJB%20to%20LFP%20WJB437F70067.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016). 
Brennan also agreed to remove any discussion of a potential deliberate indifference standard relating to a constitutional 
duty to act, borrowed from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), in order to mollify some of the Justices, in particular 
Stewart and Powell. See Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr. to Potter Stewart, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 
of City of New York, No. 75-1914, April 25, 1978, available at 
http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/WJB/Brennan%2004%20Monell%20(CF%20I-437-
7%20PDF%20Files)/4-25-78%20Memo%20WJB%20to%20PS%20WJB437F70043.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016). 
61 The Court was certainly conscious, however, of the potential financial impact on local governments’ treasuries 
caused by lifting the bar on municipal liability. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-27, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978) (No. 75-1914), available at http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/MonellDocs/z Other Source 
pdfs  Monell/Monell Oral Argument Transcript (v2).pdf. Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist addresses solely the 
economic consequences on local governments’ treasuries of lifting the bar on municipal liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 
724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of municipal immunity enunciated in Monroe has protected 
municipalities and their limited treasuries from the consequences of their officials’ failure to predict the course of this 
Court's constitutional jurisprudence.”). See also Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion, supra note 25, at 687 
(describing the view that Monell was “an ad hoc political compromise” possibly “motivated by concern about the 
perilous financial condition of some cities”). 
62 423 U.S. at 371. Acknowledging the federalism concerns, Blackmun sought to minimize the remedy’s intrusive 
aspects. He contended that the “remedy was one evolved with the defendant officials’ assent.” Id. at 381 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
63 423 U.S. at 373. The remedy, Blackmun argued, was not overly burdensome, was efficient, would improve the 
system, and reduce constitutional violations. Id. at 381 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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David Jacks Achtenberg offers an alternative explanation of the Monell outcome. 
Achtenberg contends that the Court’s municipal liability doctrine was a compromise owing to 
Justice Powell’s concern that “Monroe so severely imbalanced the structure of federalism that he 
would be willing to overrule it despite his normal concern for stare decisis.”64 Monell thus reifies 
Justice Frankfurter’s seventeen-year-old-dissenting viewpoint in Monroe that liability should only 
follow where “the wrongdoer’s conduct was actually authorized by state or local law.”65 Whether 
municipal liability may be traced in part to Frankfurter’s “color of law” theory, Monell’s municipal 
ultimately rests on case law—Rizzo—addressing structural reform litigation and injunctive relief’s 
perceived departure from “the principles of federalism,”66 the effects of which are still felt today. 
Even accepting my interpretation, Monell did in fact overrule Monroe, permitting lawsuits 
against municipalities to go forward. Some of this may be attributable to the Court’s necessary 
endorsement of judicially imposed desegregation. Justifying its departure from Monroe and its ban 
on municipal liability, the Court relied in part on the fact that school boards were still held liable 
in desegregation litigation and that Congress had continued to support this state of affairs.67  
Monell also explicitly and implicitly embraces a municipal liability remedy that 
encompasses all forms of relief. The Court expressly stated that “[l]ocal governing bodies [ ] can 
be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.”68 And the Court’s 
positive citation of federal school desegregation decrees reflected additional approval of injunctive 
relief.69 The Court’s opinion, however, might be best viewed as at once theoretically endorsing the 
school board structural reform line of cases while complicating future implementation of the 
holding by designing such demanding policy or custom and causation standards. 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, all of whom had dissented in Rizzo, may have 
considered relying on that opinion’s high causation standard in Monell as a necessary concession 
in order to cobble a majority. But the adoption of Rizzo as the municipal liability standard makes 
Monell a pyrrhic civil rights victory. Rizzo’s skepticism of federal court intervention, sounding in 
federalism, looms over every municipal liability case, even when these concerns are not significant 
or necessarily implicated. 
E. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons  
The Court made clear its concern over municipal liability and invasive equitable remedies 
when in 1983 it struck down an order enjoining the Los Angeles Police Department from 
authorizing chokeholds. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons does not explicitly address the contours of 
                                                   
 
64 Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion, supra note 25, at 693. Peter Schuck less charitably observes that the 
municipal liability “doctrine bore the unmistakable imprint of bastardy; its supporting rationale suggests nothing so 
much as a split-the-difference judicial compromise.” Peter Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some 
Lessons from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1755 n. 13 (1989). 
65 Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion, supra note 25, at 682. 
66 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 380. 
67 Monell, 436 U.S. at 696-99. 
68 Id. at 690. 
69 Id. at 696-99. 
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the causation policy standard.70 It is, nominally, a case concerning standing for injunctive relief. 
Yet it elevates the pleading standard for equitable claims in contrast to damages claims, and echoes 
the federalism concerns expressed in Rizzo, notwithstanding the less intrusive relief requested in 
Lyons. As a result, it has significantly impacted the development of municipal liability. 
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Supreme Court addressed a preliminary injunction 
against the city, prohibiting the use of chokeholds except when the suspect reasonably appears to 
be an immediate and deadly threat.71 Adolph Lyons alleged that, in connection with a traffic stop 
and without any provocation, Los Angeles police placed him in a chokehold, rendering him 
unconscious and damaging his larynx.72 Lyons further alleged that city policy authorized 
chokeholds where there is no threat of deadly force and that, as a result, many people had been 
injured.73 The Court ultimately overturned the injunction, holding that Lyons lacked standing to 
bring the claim because his injury did not evidence a “real and immediate threat” that he would be 
stopped again by police and that they would unlawfully choke him.74 In denying standing, the 
Court narrowly read Lyons’ complaint, finding that the allegation that chokeholds were authorized 
in less-than-deadly-force situations did not amount to a policy of chokeholds without 
provocation.75  
Lyons addresses arguments whether the nature of the relief requested should influence the 
legal analysis, specifically the case or controversy standard.76 The Court rejected the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s approach that imposes lesser standards where discrete 
injunctive relief is sought, as opposed to the massive structural reform pursued in cases like 
Rizzo.77 Addressing equitable relief standards, the Court maintained that courts should exercise 
restraint in light of federalism concerns.78 But the Court also applied a more exacting standing 
standard for the equitable relief as opposed to the damages relief threshold.79  
Justice Marshall took issue with the bifurcated approach. Dissenting, he contended that the 
city’s chokehold policy should suffice for purposes of both equitable and damages liability.80 
                                                   
70 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
71 Id. at 98. 
72 Id. at 97-98. 
73 Id. at 98. Between the time of the complaint’s filing and the Court’s opinion, fifteen people had died due to the 
chokehold technique. Id. at 100. The Board of Police Commissioners then placed a six-month moratorium on the use 
of chokeholds except in instances of deadly threats. Id. 
74 Id. at 105. 
75 Id. at 106 n. 7. Strictly construing the policy, the Court found any harm to Lyons remote because it would require 
that he be stopped by the police again and that he illegally resist arrest or that police again ignore orders and choke 
him without instigation. Id. at 106. 
76 Id. at 108. 
77 Id. at 108-09. 
78 Id. at 112 (Availability of injunctive relief under § 1983 does “not displace the normal principles of equity, comity 
and federalism that should inform the judgment of federal courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement 
authorities.”). 
79 Id. at 106-07 (conservatively construing allegations of abusive chokehold so as not to find policy that, the Court 
terms, “unbelievable” and questioning “odds” that plaintiffs would be subjected to unprovoked chokeholds by police) 
80 Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Lyons therefore has standing to challenge the City’s chokehold policy and to 
obtain whatever relief a court may ultimately deem appropriate. None of our prior decisions suggests that his requests 
for particular forms of relief raise any additional issues concerning his standing.”); id. at 122-23 (“[B]y fragmenting 
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Similar to the Ninth Circuit, Marshall also argued that the nature of the equitable relief should 
impact the federalism assessment. He distinguished Lyons as a case seeking only a preliminary 
injunction concerning limited relief, whereas in Rizzo, at issue was a permanent injunction 
involving comprehensive reforms.81  
Lyons essentially closed the door on private civil lawsuits seeking structural reform.82 
Though not framed in terms of § 1983, the Court’s stringent case or controversy requirement for 
injunctive relief could just as easily be replaced with Monell’s policy-causation requirement. 
Marshall lamented that the decision left victims of systematic police violence with “only an award 
of damages.”83 But the Court’s subsequent municipal liability jurisprudence renders Marshall’s 
comment—sadly—overly optimistic. 
F. Monell’s Legacy 
Over the past thirty years, Monell’s promise of municipal liability has proven to be a paper 
tiger. The Court has only developed a set of stricter requirements to establish municipal liability. 
David Jacks Achtenberg complains that the doctrine’s exceedingly high and “idiosyncratically 
protective” standards exceed those prescribed for private employers, negligent selection of 
independent contractors, non-constitutional torts, and even damages against private employers.84 
Peter Schuck similarly criticizes the Court for unfaithfully and inconsistently applying private tort 
law concepts to municipal liability.85 He also takes to task the Court’s “official policy” test and 
causation standards for failing to appreciate the invariable “causal nexus between agency and 
injury.”86 Moreover, terms such as “policy” and “policymaker” are so ill-defined as to “bear[ ] 
only a superficial resemblance to the type of public agency at which § 1983 claims are typically 
directed.”87 
The Rizzo-influenced federalism concerns pervade the Court’s opinions limiting municipal 
liability, notwithstanding the fact that virtually all these cases address only damages claims. In 
addition, many of these cases echo Rizzo’s lingering dispute over when or whether single instances 
                                                   
a single claim into multiple claims for particular types of relief and requiring a separate showing of standing for each 
form of relief, the decision today departs from this Court’s traditional conception of standing and of the remedial 
powers of the federal courts.”); id. at 127 (“In determining whether a plaintiff has standing, we have always focused 
on his personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, not on the issues sought to be litigated, or the ‘precise nature 
of the relief sought.’”) (citations omitted). 
81 Id. at 133-34 (“The modest interlocutory relief granted in this case differs markedly, however, from the intrusive 
injunction involved in Rizzo, and simply does not implicate the federalism concerns that arise when a federal court 
undertakes to ‘supervise the functioning of the police department.’”) (quoting Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 380 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)). 
82 See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 27, at 1386. 
83 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
84 David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate 
Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2191 (2005) [hereinafter Achtenberg, Taking History 
Seriously]. Achtenberg traces the standards to the Court’s concern for the “municipal pocketbook.” Id. 
85 Schuck, supra note 64, at 1763.  
86 Id. at 1764-65. See also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rules for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 236 
(2013) (characterizing the legal standards for identifying official policy or custom as “radically indeterminate”) 
[hereinafter Jeffries, Jr., Liability Rules]. 
87 Schuck, supra note 64, at 1775-78. 
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of misconduct amount to a systematic problem, which could evince municipal liability.88 The 
federalism-influenced debate over what amounts to a sufficiently obvious or systematic problem 
suffuses the Court’s treatment of “failure to train” and “failure to review” damages cases. 
In 1989, the Court held in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris that a local government’s failure 
to train police officers on the use of deadly force could establish municipal liability because violent 
encounters are sufficiently predictable as to render a lack of training deliberately indifferent.89 But 
as with Monell, the promise of Harris is illusory. The Court stressed the need for a significant 
standard of fault in failure to train claims, relying on both Monell and Rizzo.90 A failure to train 
claim will only meet the § 1983 “policy or custom” standard if it amounts to “deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.”91 
Lack of training could only be characterized as policy where the “need for more or different 
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional 
rights.”92 
The Harris Court explained that a lesser standard would violate Monell’s strictures, 
amounting to “de facto respondeat superior liability.”93 The Court cited Rizzo for its federalism 
argument, contending that a lesser standard “would also engage the federal courts in an endless 
exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs. This is an exercise we believe 
the federal courts are ill suited to undertake, as well as one that would implicate serious questions 
of federalism.”94  
Eight years later, in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, the Court 
held that a county’s alleged failure to properly review an applicant deputy sheriff’s history could 
not render the county liable for the deputy sheriff’s excessive force.95 The Court held that a 
thorough background check would not have turned up information suggesting the likelihood that 
he would use excessive force during his employment.96 The lack of a causal connection meant that 
the county was not deliberately indifferent to the risk of a constitutional violation. Though no 
injunctive relief was sought, the Court again adopted the mantle of protecting local government 
autonomy from federal-judicial intrusion: “A failure to apply stringent culpability and causation 
requirements raises serious federalism concerns, in that it risks constitutionalizing particular hiring 
requirements that States have themselves elected not to impose.”97 
In its most recent, extensive discussion of municipal liability in 2011, the Court held that 
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office was not liable for district attorneys’ failure to disclose 
                                                   
88 See HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 135 (2013). 
89 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
90 Id. at 391-92. 
91 Id. at 388-89. 
92 Id. at 390. 
93 Id. at 392 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 693–694). 
94 Id. at 392 (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 607-08). 
95 520 U.S. 397. 
96 Id. at 405, 408-11, 312-14. 
97 Id. at 415. 
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exculpatory evidence because of its failure to train them on the constitutional requirements.98 In 
Connick v. Thompson, the Court found that, despite at least four Brady violations, the risk of 
additional violations was not so great as to require corrective action in the form of training on 
prosecutors’ disclosure obligations.99 In his concurrence, Scalia raised the same Monell-respondeat 
superior liability and Rizzo-federalism concerns over a lesser standard for holding municipalities 
liable for failure to train.100  
While case law continues to justify restrictions on individuals’ municipal liability claims 
for police abuses by invoking principles of federalism, legislation has existed for almost a quarter-
century that affords the federal executive branch authority to pursue injunctive relief against the 
same police departments and local governments. Ironically, the latter authorities may raise greater 
concerns over federalism than individual municipal liability damages claims. More problematic, 
the statutory framework insufficiently addresses the compensatory, democratic, procedural justice, 
and civil recourse vacuum caused by the judicially imposed limitation on municipal liability 
claims. 
 
II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION  
Increased concern over police brutality—in particular the beating of Rodney King and 
resulting social unrest—and appreciation that the courts effective foreclosed § 1983 litigation as 
police reform tool, impelled Congress to enact new legislation. In 1994 Congress passed the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which, in part, authorizes the Attorney 
General to file a civil cause of action when local police agencies engage in a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional misconduct.101 Under the act, the Justice Department may seek declaratory and 
equitable relief, but not damages, to eliminate the misconduct.102 Private litigants, however, are 
afforded no such cause of action.103 
 
Section 14141 advocates credit the law for important police reforms.104 Section 14141 
actions compel and foster institutional changes that local entities would not otherwise implement 
                                                   
98 563 U.S. 51 (2011). 
99 Id. at 62. 
100 Id. at 74 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 693–694; 
Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 607-08)). 
101 Pub. L. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796; codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141. 
102 Id. 
103 Scholars have advocated analog private causes of action and Congress contemplated amendments to similar effect. 
See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 27, at 1417-18 (proposing authorization of private 
individuals to bring injunctive lawsuits under § 14141, with Justice Department retaining authority to quash such 
lawsuits); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3241-43 (2014) 
(advocating similar proposal) [hereinafter Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform]; Law Enforcement Trust 
and Integrity Act of 2000, H.R. 3927, 106th Cong. § 502; Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 
2656, 106th Cong. § 501. For a critique of the proposed private right of action as deleterious to police reform efforts, 
see Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 57-62 (2009) 
[hereinafter Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights]. 
104 Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ 
Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 794-95 (2016) (discussing documentation of DOJ success in 
addressing police violence pursuant to § 14141); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police 
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1359-63 (2015) (discussing studies finding § 14141 effective at reducing police 
misconduct) [hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation]. 
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for political and economic reasons.105 These changes usually include significant transparency and 
accountability mechanisms and lead to sustained corrections of police misconduct.106 Reforms 
under § 14141 also may reduce future litigations costs related to police abuses.107 
From a federalism perspective, however, section § 14141 and its attendant systematic 
injunctive relief may raise more concerns than individual damages lawsuits under § 1983. 
Structural reform litigation under § 14141 entails significant federal influence over local law 
enforcement policies and practices. Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards characterize such federal 
reforms as “the single most invasive form of external legal regulation imposed on American police 
departments.”108 Currently, “nearly one in five Americans is served by a law enforcement agency 
that has been subject to a Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation via § 14141.”109 As of 2016, 
the DOJ has conducted 61 formal investigations and entered into 31 settlement agreements with 
local entities, many of which were subjected to ongoing federal oversight.110  
The scope of § 14141 investigations and subsequent agreements and oversight is extensive. 
Most agreements, for example, require reforming a range of police practices, including use of force 
policies, reporting requirements, training, and internal investigations.111 Agreements under § 
14141 also result in lengthy federal oversight of local police and high compliance standards, with 
monitoring spanning five to twelve years.112  
The costs of § 14141 reforms are also significant. And it is local governments that must 
pay for the changes, pushing the increased costs onto local taxpayers. Rushin estimates that Los 
Angeles, for example, paid out over $100 million during the time of its consent decree’s 
implementation and external monitoring.113 
Though virtually all structural reforms are undertaken through settlement agreements, § 
14141 invariably entails federal coercion in the form of highly public investigations or threatened 
litigation.114 Section 14141 actions thus inevitably impose federal priorities on local governmental 
discretion. The DOJ’s impact may include requiring uniform changes that are not particularized to 
local needs,115 “forc[ing] municipalities to prioritize investments into police reform over other 
                                                   
105 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104, at 1397-1404. 
106 Id. at 1404. Some research suggests, however, that reforms may falter once oversight and monitoring end under a 
consent decree. Id. at 1410-11. 
107 Id. at 1410-11. 
108 Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 727 n.18 (2017). 
109 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104 at 1347-48, 1370.  
110 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 108, at 730; Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104, at 1377. 
111 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104, at 1379. A few agreements also directly address bias and 
race in local policing. Id. at 1385-86. Rushin and Edwards contend that the wide scope and oversight arsenal under § 
14141 make local police more likely to implement reforms than in response to individual cases often addressing a 
discrete procedural issue. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 108, at 750-51. 
112 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104, at 1392. Fig. 5, 1394. 
113 Id. at 1393. 
114 Id. at 1399-1400; Rushin & Edwards, supra note 108, at 728, 746 (noting “intense public scrutiny” caused by 
investigations). 
115 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104, at 1378 (“While each negotiated settlement should be 
specifically tailored to the unique needs of the individual municipality, the settlements have proven to be remarkably 
similar over time.”) 
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municipal goals,” which may be at odds with the community’s preferences,116 and altering local 
government leadership.117  
In addition, some scholars contend that while the § 14141 reform process may address and 
improve system-wide police abuses, it also disrupts local communities and their relationships with 
police. Rushin and Edwards argue that “public § 14141 investigations are destabilizing incidents 
within targeted communities that expose the affected police departments to added public distrust 
and negative interactions.”118 They also contend that § 14141 reforms have led to crime increases 
as a result of less aggressive and efficient policing.119 
Moreover, the § 14141 “pattern or practice” liability standard appears far more capacious—
at least in practice—than the § 1983 liability requirements. Indeed, the DOJ and some 
commentators believe § 14141 operates as a strict liability regime, requiring only the 
demonstration of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct to justify declaratory or equitable 
relief from local governments and police departments.120 As a result state and local governments 
and police fall easily under federal court jurisdiction and oversight.  
For example, the DOJ argued in 2016 structural reform litigation against two Colorado 
towns that the municipalities should be found liable for their police officers’ pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional violations “without any additional showing of municipal liability.”121 The DOJ 
contended that § 1983 liability standards should not apply to § 14141 actions because the latter (1) 
did not focus on individual conduct but on systemic violations, and (2) did not provide a damages 
remedy but only declaratory and equitable relief.122 Because virtually all local police entities have 
bowed to federal pressure and entered settlement agreements and consent decrees few courts have 
addressed the DOJ’s strict liability argument.123 In light of the comparatively low threshold for § 
14141 actions, the federal government can easily entangle itself in local policing matters affecting 
wide swaths of law enforcement, leadership, and municipal finances for long periods of time. 
Notwithstanding the powerful and ready tool that is structural reform litigation under § 
14141, resources and politics limit its more widespread application. And these constraints may 
diminish federalism concerns.124 First, federal resources cannot be utilized to address all 18,000 
                                                   
116 Id. at 1397-1400. 
117 Id. at 1400. 
118 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 108, at 753. 
119 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 108. See also Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 106, at 1412-13. 
120 See U.S. v. Colorado City, No. 3:12cv8123-HRH, 2016 WL 634118 (D. Ariz.); Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, 
supra note 103, at 60.  
121 Colorado City, No. 3:12cv8123-HRH, 2016 WL 634118 (D. Ariz.) (U.S. Gov’t Trial Motion, Memorandum and 
Affidavit). 
122 Id. 
123 The only court that reached the §14141 liability issue rejected the DOJ’s differentiated standards argument. United 
States v. City of Columbus, No. 99-1097, 2000 WL 1133166, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000) (holding § 1983 
municipal liability standard applies to § 14141 claims). Few jurisdictions have resisted entering settlement agreements 
under § 14141. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (holding DOJ failed to 
establish pattern or practice of constitutional violations). The case has been appealed. 
124 John Jeffries, Jr. and George Rutherglen also contend that § 14141 does not raise the same issues of “interference 
with state and local government” as individual-plaintiff-initiated lawsuits because federal orders “obtained by federal 
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local police agencies throughout the country.125 While § 14141 reform efforts often focus on some 
of the largest U.S. cities thereby impacting a substantial portion of the public, the vast majority of 
police departments escape federal scrutiny and management.126  
Second, federal political prerogatives dictate how frequently the DOJ employs its § 14141 
authorities. The Clinton and Obama administration pursued far more § 14141 actions than did the 
Bush administration.127 And early in its term the Trump administration expressed disdain for § 
14141 actions, criticizing the use of such authority as inimical to federalism principles.128 Section 
§ 14141 police reform—and the attendant federal intrusion—will therefore fluctuate with political 
priorities.  
Though political- and resource-driven concerns may limit federal interference in local 
policing, § 14141 may more squarely implicate the federalism concerns the Supreme Court raised 
in Monell and its progeny over § 1983 municipal liability claims. Indeed, the massive police 
department reforms undertaken through § 14141 appear to outpace the systemic changes addressed 
in Rizzo and United States v. Philadelphia.  
While § 14141 has been an important tool in addressing police abuses, it is also an 
imperfect solution to the municipal liability lacuna. First, the differing political agendas and 
resource constraints that may render § 14141 less offensive to federalism concerns also limit its 
utility as tool for consistently combatting pervasive police misconduct.  
Second, § 14141 fails to address procedural justice and local concerns that might be 
realized through a properly construed and applied § 1983. Section 14141’s usage brings both 
attention and some improvement to systemic problems in local policing, but the changes are often 
top-down solutions, lacking community engagement and input.129  
Several scholars have proposed amending § 14141 to authorize actions for equitable and 
injunctive relief by private attorneys-general to address the law’s lack of local representation and 
                                                   
officials involve some degree of political accountability in the decision to sue and to seek structural relief.” John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. and George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1421 (2007).  
125 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 108, at 750; Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 106, at 1415-16. 
126 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 108, at 750, 750 n. 144 (“99.7% of American law enforcement agencies have not 
been subject to DOJ intervention or investigation via § 14141”). 
127 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104, at 1371-72. 
128 Sessions Memo, supra note 15. 
129 See Patel, supra note 10, at 800 (2016) (describing “ways in which communities have felt marginalized in the 
DOJ's efforts to reform police departments”); id. at 799 (observing that “community engagement, with little exception, 
has largely fallen short of advocates' and harmed communities' expectations for reform”); Myriam E. Gilles, In 
Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 879 
(2001) (“A regime that forces community leaders—particularly in minority communities-to come hat in hand to 
federal officials seeking protection of their civil rights is at cross purposes with a zeitgeist that encourages community 
empowerment and everywhere looks to roll back reliance upon government.”) [hereinafter Gilles, In Defense of 
Making Government Pay]; Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 27, at 1387 (noting that the 
primacy of § 14141 in structural reform of police practices ignores “the eyes, experiences, motivation, and resources 
of millions of Americans who bear witness to institutionalized wrongdoing and are willing to endure the expense of 
rooting it out.”). 
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agency. 130 Though laudable, these statutory reforms might subject individual-initiated suits to DOJ 
approval and impede federal officials own reform efforts.131 
Finally, even if viewed as an adjunct to § 1983, § 14141 aids only § 1983’s deterrence goal 
but provides no compensation for victims. As a result, a strange system of bifurcated municipal 
liability emerges when it comes to police misconduct—one that permits selective and limited 
government-initiated systemic, injunctive relief claims to flow readily but practically bans 
individual victims’ discrete damages claims.132 The next part accordingly proposes that damages 
claims against municipal entities should be held to a lesser standard of proof. 
III. A DISTINCT AND LENIENT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY DAMAGES STANDARD 
Premised on the revisionist account that what initially animated the Court’s stringent 
causation standards for municipal liability was concern over intrusive injunctive relief, I argue 
here that relief under § 1983 should be bifurcated; specifically, municipal liability claims for 
damages relief merit a diminished standard of proof. Even if one does not accept the revisionist 
account of Monell, the functional argument is similar: the discrete and retrospective nature of 
damages does not raise the same federalism concerns as equitable relief’s prospective and often 
invasive reforms. Moreover, historical skepticism of injunctive relief—independent of municipal 
liability—argues for distinct standards. Finally, the lesser standard should facilitate compensation 
to victims, buttress the public’s faith in the legal system, ensure some vindication of constitutional 
rights, and properly affix responsibility for police misconduct. 
 
A. The Historical and Practical Relationship Between Damages and Injunctive and 
Equitable Relief 
Historically, injunctions were viewed as extraordinary relief, to be used “sparingly” even 
in disputes between private parties.133 Unless a remedy at law proved inadequate, an equitable 
remedy was not available. These general principles of equitable restraint apply with even greater 
force where federal courts are asked to enjoin state or local government actions.134 Several scholars 
contend that, given the “historical relationship” between law and equity, “damages should be at 
least as available as injunctions, if not more.”135  
                                                   
130 Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 27, at 1417-18; Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 
supra note 14, at 482 (endorsing Gilles’s proposal and adding that she “would allow prevailing plaintiffs bringing 
pattern and practice claims to recover attorneys’ fees under section 1988 as an additional incentive.”). 
131 Rachel Harmon questions whether private suits would aid § 14141 reforms, arguing that they may be ineffective, 
if litigated alone, and also may interfere with federal investigations and lawsuits. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, 
supra note 10, at 57-62.  
132 Recognizing the federalism concerns that § 14141 actions trigger, John Parry proposes a more lenient injunctive 
relief standard under § 1983 (moving back from Lyons) in order to achieve institutional corrections. John T. Parry, 
Judicial Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73, 116-21 
(2002). 
133 Irwin v. Dixon, 9 How. 10, 33, 13 L.Ed. 25 (1850); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378. 
134 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379-80. 
135 See John Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 
(2013) (addressing implied constitutional actions); id. (“To arrange the doctrine differently ‘gets the traditional 
interplay between law and equity exactly backwards.’ If the Court is to respect history, therefore, it should dramatically 
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Law has long recognized that the mode of redress affects how to assess responsibility or 
blameworthiness. The distinct civil and criminal regimes, for example, with their differing 
methods of accountability, e.g., damages v. imprisonment, influence the burdens of proof, e.g., 
preponderance of the evidence v. beyond a reasonable doubt. The import of a criminal 
conviction—deprivation of liberty, moral opprobrium, stigma—justifies requiring greater proof of 
misconduct than do the trappings of civil penalties such as fines. Even in a unitary regime like § 
1983, then, different remedies should reasonably dictate the standards by which courts review 
government actor misconduct. 
By their very nature damages will not usually entail judicial interference in government 
action in the same disruptive manner as equitable and injunctive relief. Damages are generally 
retrospective, discrete, measurable, and predictable. Equitable and injunctive remedies are 
frequently prospective, indefinite, indeterminate, and often wide-ranging. Contrary to injunctive 
relief, courts also may fashion damages remedies at some remove from emergent events, usually 
after obtaining significant information.136 In a determining a damages remedy, courts may 
therefore “exercise such judicial virtues as calm reflection and dispassionate application of the law 
to the facts.”137 The current state of police misconduct litigation under § 1983 and § 14141, 
however, inverts the law and equity relationship, paying little heed to its historical antecedents and 
practical application.138 
B. The Importance of Municipal Damages for Constitutional Torts 
Enabling local government and police department liability for damages for constitutional 
violations is critical to ensuring police accountability. A viable monetary remedy against 
municipalities for police brutality affords a modicum of compensation to victims, restores public 
trust in the law, develops legal rights, and assigns moral blame.  
1. Compensation and Motivation 
It is entirely possible that not enough people sue police departments. According to Bureau 
of Justice Statistics from 2002, only 1.3 percent of people who believe the police used improper 
                                                   
increase the availability of implied constitutional damages.” (quoting Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and 
Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1135 (1989)). John Preis acknowledges that the Court could—
instead of extending damages availability—“withdraw the easy availability of injunctive actions, thus making them 
harder to obtain than damages actions.” Id. at 4. It could be argued that in Lyons the Court returned to a more traditional 
approach to addressing claims of relief, treating prospective remedies more skeptically than damages, albeit through 
the standing doctrine, rather than under § 1983 causation standards. But this argument ignores the inapposite equitable 
relief-influenced federalism concerns that suffuse the Monell causation requirement to begin with, resulting in an 
inappropriate high-causation burden as the floor. See supra Part I.D., F. 
136 Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Addressing the availability of a Bivens-damages remedy for 
conditions of confinement after the September 11 terrorist attacks Justice Breyer notes that courts are more likely to 
defer to government action during emergencies, making a damages remedy all the more vital in securing some 
accountability for government excesses. 
137 Id. 
138 Prior to Monroe, “[h]owever, many suits that might have been brought under § 1983 as interpreted by Monroe were 
treated instead as actions for a remedy (usually an injunction) implied directly under the Constitution.” RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1081 (5th ed. 2003). 
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force against them ever filed a lawsuit.139 At the most basic level, a broadened municipal liability 
damages remedy should result in more lawsuits and more money in more victims’ pockets.140 The 
potentially lacking deterrent effect should not necessarily detract from a diminished liability 
standard’s legitimacy when it compensates a victim of a constitutional violation.141  
While plaintiffs could have any number of reasons for suing a municipality, money may 
motivate them to endure the temporal, financial, and psychological costs of litigation.142 Financial 
compensation is a vital element of a tort system, whether one takes a damages-as-indemnification 
or a damages-as-redress approach.143 And in many instances, other constitutional rights remedies, 
be they protective in the form of suppression, or prospective, styled as an injunction, may not be 
available.144 Lifting the constraints on municipal liability should prod more people to seek 
retrospective money damages for constitutional violations. 
2. Trust and Procedural Justice 
Police abuse and lack of accountability—civil and criminal—can easily erode people’s 
respect for, and allegiance to, legal institutions.145 Enabling more individual lawsuits seeking 
damages from local governments to proceed to trial may combat these ill effects, instilling greater 
public trust in the legal system. An easier municipal damages lawsuit process also achieves an 
important degree of public community engagement and empowerment. 
 
Tom Tyler’s procedural justice studies find that people’s perceptions of the fairness of 
judicial proceedings significantly influence their acceptance of decisions and respect for the legal 
system.146 Moreover, the influence of fair procedures does not vary based on people’s racial, ethnic 
and socio-economic background.147 
 
                                                   
139 See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 841, 863 & n. 133 (2012) (citing 
MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE 
AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY, at 16-20 (2005)). 
140 Undoubtedly other factors explain people’s reluctance to sue over police excessive force. Daniel Meltzer suggests 
that many victims’ interactions with the police were as “suspects or defendants” and that they may not sue due to 
“ignorance of their rights, poverty, fear of police reprisals, or the burdens of incarceration.” Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys 
General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284 (1988). Other injuries may not merit litigation because they are “small, widely 
dispersed, and intangible.” Id. 
141 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Damages as a traditional form of compensation for invasion 
of a legally protected interest may be entirely appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on future official 
lawlessness might be thought to result.”). 
142 Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, supra note 14, at 451 (observing that plaintiff’s motivations in a damages 
lawsuit may involve several objectives: “to punish individual defendants, to reform law enforcement, to have their 
day in court, or to get paid”). 
143 Wells, supra note 5, at 1036. 
144 Id. at 1051. See also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is 
damages or nothing.”). 
145 Mike Hough et al., Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy, 4 POLICING 203, 205 (2010); Walter 
Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investigations of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 235, 237 (2015). 
146 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 COURT REVIEW 26-27 (2007). 
147 Id. at 28. 
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Heightened municipal liability standards fail to meet a core procedural justice principle: 
voice. “Having an opportunity to voice their perspective has a positive effect upon people’s 
experience with the legal system irrespective of their outcome, as long as they feel that the 
authority sincerely considered their arguments before making their decision.”148 Simply put, a 
more generous standard ensures that the victim “feels heard.”149  
 
Permitting more victims to participate in damages actions against their respective 
governments and police departments—even if they ultimately lose—improves “perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the system and about the [adjudication] process.”150 Allowing more cases to extend 
beyond motions to dismiss and for summary judgment also enables victims to “publicly present 
their stories and have them ‘authenticated,’ create a public record of the events, and have their 
cases decided by a jury.”151 These lawsuits also may become civic opportunities for public 
engagement and education on government misconduct and reform regardless of the lawsuit’s 
outcome. They also may provide autonomy and agency to some of a community’s often-most-
marginalized population.152 
 
3. Vindicating Constitutional Rights 
 Increasing damages liability exposure for municipalities may be justified under civil 
recourse theory. As opposed to the traditional tort rationale, which emphasizes indemnification, 
“the civil recourse principle holds that the point of tort law should be to empower the plaintiff to 
exact redress for wrongs.”153 Compensation is certainly part of the tort action’s objective. But 
along with a victim’s losses, a fact-finder should consider “the character of the defendant’s 
conduct, . . . and the power dynamic between the parties.”154  
Michael Wells argues that the constitutional torts context especially merits application of 
civil recourse principles.155 Obtaining a damages remedy—or at least a hearing in court—against 
a governmental entity for constitutional violations is more compelling than in the private tort 
context “because the rights asserted are more vital and the defendants from whom redress is sought 
are more powerful and more dangerous.”156 Indeed the very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Bill of Rights is to protect the people from government abuse.157 
                                                   
148 Id. at 30. 
149 Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 511 n. 37 (2012). 
150 Id. at 511 n. 37 (2012) (citing E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
206-15 (1988)). See also Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 COURT REVIEW 26 (2007) (explain that 
litigants “accept ‘losing’ more willingly if the court procedures used to handle their case are fair”). 
151 Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Summary Judgment and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 996 (2004). 
152 See Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 129, at 879 (criticizing dependence on federal 
officials under § 14141 as “at cross purposes with a zeitgeist that encourages community empowerment”). 
153 Wells, supra note 5, at 1009. Michael Wells traces the Court’s animosity to government constitutional tort liability 
to a tort theory focused on “indemnification” and “allocation of losses.” Id. at 1005-07 (discussing Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978); Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986)). 
154 John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 435 
(2006). 
155 Wells, supra note 5, at 1012-13 
156 Id. at 1012. 
157 Id. 
Avidan Y. Cover          52 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW ___ [Forthcoming 2018]           October 2, 2017 
24 
 
Civil recourse should permit more constitutional tort lawsuits to get through the courthouse 
doors without bankrupting local governments. The focus on vindicating constitutional rights 
makes it harder “to justify rules that foreclose plaintiffs from obtaining” damages at all.158 Civil 
recourse theory therefore dictates a departure from the Monell-driven heightened municipal 
liability standards for damages.159 But because the primary objective of civil recourse is to redress 
constitutional wrongs, a damages award need not always provide full compensation for actual 
losses.160 Civil recourse thus affords factfinders a good deal of flexibility as they consider the 
varying equities and policy considerations often attendant to constitutional litigation in reaching 
damages calculations.161 Legislators might similarly consider incorporating limits on damages in 
connection with reduced liability standards.162 
Other scholars have advocated making it easier to obtain relief for certain constitutional 
torts through presumed or nominal damages. Jean C. Love contends that presumed damages are 
the only means for compensating “the infringement of constitutionally protected intangible 
interests.”163 She proposes that victims of, for example, procedural due process violations, should 
not have to prove actual damages, as is the case with dignitary torts such as defamation.164 Under 
such a legislatively crafted regime, victims would be able to recover a liquidated sum, guaranteeing 
a minimum amount, or a range, from which the court could determine the appropriate award.165 
Love also acknowledges that a more lenient standard of proof of damages would also at least 
facilitate better compensation of  constitutional torts victims.166  
Advocates of more readily awarding nominal damages argue that such relief will facilitate 
judicial vindication of constitutional rights because courts will not be deterred by concern over the 
remedy’s financial impact.167 As several critics have noted, however, the lack of sufficient 
monetary relief may fail to motivate plaintiffs to sue and therefore prevent sufficient development 
and protection of constitutional rights.168 
                                                   
158 Id. at 1008. 
159 Id. at 1052-53. 
160 Id. at 1036. 
161 Id. at 1034. See id. at 1054 (“[C]ivil recourse consistently and broadly favors at least some vindication of 
constitutional rights and some redress of constitutional wrongs.”). 
162 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
163 Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1242, 1282 (1979). 
Love also advocates permitting punitive damages against municipalities. Id. at 1277-78. 
164 Id. at 1261 
165 Id. at 1284 
166 Id. at 1282. 
167 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal 
Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1607-08 (2011) (proposing that suits for nominal damages should entitle 
plaintiffs to “immunity-free determination of their constitutional claims’) [hereinafter Pfander, Resolving the Qualified 
Immunity Dilemma]; Smith, supra note 1, at 483-84 (addressing nominal damages approach for local governments). 
168 Love, supra note 163, at 1272. Love contends that nominal damages do not serve the purposes of compensation, 
deterrence, and vindication because the one-dollar award makes it unlikely that plaintiffs will “initiate constitutional 
tort litigation to recover nominal damages alone.” Id. In fact, Love argues, nominal damages’ small amount may “more 
often have the symbolic effect of diminishing the legitimacy of the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. at 1281. Pfander 
acknowledges the concerns over motivation and even suggests that nominal damages could foster greater judicial 
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4. Affixing Responsibility 
Less restrictive municipal liability standards for damages also may better approximate a 
local government’s actual responsibility for constitutional violations. Myriam Gilles praises 
municipal liability principally for its “fault-fixing function.”169 Gilles criticizes government 
indemnification of individual officers for their constitutional violations because it fails to apportion 
blame or deter and reform police misconduct.170 First, indemnification is generally a contractually-
bargained benefit, predating a constitution violation.171 Thus payouts are unlikely to compel local 
governments to seriously assess department culpability and government leaders will regard them 
as the “costs of doing business.”172 Second, indemnification allows local governments to “deflect 
attention from systemic and institutional factors contributing to recurring constitutional 
deprivations” by focusing on only the “bad cops.”173 
Municipal liability, on the other hand, Gilles contends, “makes it more difficult to take 
refuge in the ‘bad apple theory’ and more likely that the municipality will take steps to remedy the 
broader problem.”174 Apart from economic motivations, municipal liability is more likely to 
publicly shame local government as well as expose information through discovery that may be 
beyond the scope of individual officer lawsuits.175 Extolling municipal liability’s “predictable and 
salutary effects” on police misconduct,176 Gilles proposes broadening liability to encompass 
“customs” that local police ignore and tacitly encourage.177  
Peter Schuck also would reduce standards for municipal liability to better align with private 
tort conceptions of responsibility and more accurately reflect how local government causes 
unlawful behavior.178 First, Schuck argues, the “local government’s nexus to the violation” should 
often “satisfy both the cause-in-fact and proximate cause criteria, as those concepts are understood 
in private tort law.”179 Putting aside vicarious liability, the government’s relationship to the 
government worker who commits the violation amounts to “plac[ing] her in a position in which 
                                                   
hostility toward compensatory relief and reduce the number of claims against higher officials. Pfander, Resolving the 
Qualified Immunity Dilemma, supra note 167, at 1634-36. 
169 Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 129, at 863. See also Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 
170 F.3d 311, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The ability to promote an individual official’s “scrupulous observance” of the 
Constitution is important. Perhaps even more important to society, however, is the ability to hold a municipality 
accountable where official policy or custom has resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights.”). 
170 Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 129, at 863. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 
B.U. L. REV. 17, 31 (2000) [hereinafter Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence]; Gilles, In Defense of Making 
Government Pay, supra note 129, at 862. 
174 Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 129, at 863. 
175 Id. at 859-60. 
176 Id. at 867. 
177 Id. at 867-68; Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence, supra note 173. Gilles also would subject local governments 
to punitive damages for “systemic and widespread” constitutional violations. Gilles, In Defense of Making 
Government Pay, supra note 129, at 873. 
178 Schuck, supra note 64, at 1764-65 (noting that “some causal nexus between agency and injury almost invariably 
exists as a factual matter”). 
179 Id. at 1779. 
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the violation is possible, perhaps (on some facts) even probable.”180 Second, the local government 
operates a monopoly over services like policing and thus also undertakes “special moral 
obligations to perform them in socially beneficial ways.”181 Finally, “risk-creating” endeavors such 
as policing also merit liability just as would a similarly hazardous private enterprises.182 The 
reduced damage standards for municipalities thus cohere with a more realistic, but moral, 
comprehension of local government responsibility for police abuse. 
A more permissive municipal damages liability standard also should address the 
interdependent weaknesses of qualified immunity.183 Victims of police officer abuse may be left 
with no one to hold accountable because of both immunity doctrines’ government-favoring biases. 
Yet concerns over unfairly penalizing officers when a constitutional right’s clarity is lacking have 
some force. The doctrine goes too far, however, when officers may deny the clarity of a prohibition 
despite their own department’s policy guidance banning the misconduct at issue.184  
As I have argued elsewhere, qualified immunity doctrine should be changed to encompass 
local department policies as evidence of a “clearly established right.”185 As a necessary 
complement to that move, I propose in Part IV that municipalities should be subject to damages 
liability where they lack policies that, according to national consensus, are necessary to prevent 
constitutional violations, and a person is therefore injured.186 These fixes should better 
approximate actual individual officer and officer liability. The delineation of responsibility also 
might encourage departments to better develop and adopt appropriate police policies. 
C. Responses to a Bifurcated Relief-based Regime. 
The following discussion addresses possible objections to bifurcating relief, most of which 
are grounded in the Court’s § 1983 and immunity jurisprudence. The section also focuses on 
potential legislative history arguments against a bifurcated model.  
 
1. Undifferentiated Relief-based Approach to § 1983  
The Supreme Court has not embraced a bifurcated relief-based approach to § 1983 claims. 
The Court has generally treated claims against municipalities the same regardless of whether the 
relief sought is monetary or equitable. Certainly the language of § 1983 does not distinguish 
between the modes of relief: “Every person . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”187  
                                                   
180 Id. The government has “authorized (perhaps mandated), supervised, trained, equipped, and paid the individual 
who causes injury.” Id. Schuck also argues that, rather than causation, municipal liability may be viewed as a duty to 
control—a concept that has generally expanded in private law. Id. at 1764-72. 
181 Id. at 1780. 
182 Id. 
183 See Smith, supra note 1, at 478 (“[B]ecause immunities for government agents and immunities for local entities 
often work in tandem to block constitutional accountability, the optimal approach to adjudicating constitutional torts 
should take this synergy into account.”). 
184 See Cover, supra note 3, at 1824-31. 
185 Id.  
186 See infra Part IV.A. 
187 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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Two years after Monroe, in City of Kenosha, Wisconsin v. Bruno, the Court rejected 
applying differing liability standards based on the relief requested. Justice Rehnquist explained, 
“We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in the language actually used 
by Congress, to suggest that the generic word ‘person’ in s 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated 
application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them.”188  
 
Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, contended in his partial dissent that that opinion 
had only foreclosed monetary relief against local government, not equitable relief.189 Douglas’s 
legislative historical account of § 1983—revised and overruled by Monell—attributed Congress’ 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment to the destructive and paralyzing effect of damages on 
municipalities.190 But Monell, which addressed what, in practice, were monetary claims, overruled 
Monroe’s bar on municipal liability, yet clarified that it did not disturb the Monroe-progeny’s 
holding that § 1983 applied equally to both equitable and monetary claims of relief.191 
 
Finally, in 2010, the Court unanimously held in Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries that 
Monell’s “causation requirement” applies, regardless of whether the plaintiffs seek damages or 
equitable relief.192 The Court rejected the argument that claims for injunctive relief should not be 
subject to the “policy or custom” requirement of claims for damages. As the Court explained, 
“whether an action or omission is a municipality’s ‘own’ has to do with the nature of the action or 
omission, not with the nature of the relief that is later sought in court.”193 The Court stressed that 
Monell’s causation requirement and rejection of respondeat superior were not so much motivated 
by economic concerns but by limiting municipal liability to its “own wrongful conduct.”194  
 
As I argued earlier, I am not convinced that Monell’s municipal liability standards can be 
untethered from the Court’s worries over protracted federal judicial involvement in institutional 
reform litigation. Moreover, the § 1983 liability regime is so messy as to confound such purported 
analytical consistency.195 
 
2. Ex parte Young  
A bifurcated approach that is more lenient regarding damages claims also runs counter to 
the underlying logic of the arrangement vis-à-vis state liability. The state constitutional torts 
liability regime is illogically distinct from the approach to local government. Under the Eleventh 
                                                   
188 412 U.S. at 513. 
189 See id. at 516 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“I have expressed my doubts in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 
U.S. 693, 722 (dissenting opinion) that our decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, bars equitable relief against a 
municipality.”) (citations omitted). 
190 Id. at 519-20 (“To the extent that the Sherman Amendment was directed only at liability for damages and the 
devastating effect those damages might have on municipalities, it seems that the defeat of the amendment does not 
affect the existence vel non of an equitable action.”). 
191 436 U.S. at 701 n. 66. 
192 562 U.S. 29, 37 (2010) (“Monell’s logic also argues against any such relief-based bifurcation.”).  
193 Id. at 37. 
194 Id. at 38. 
195 Jeffries, Jr., Liability Rules, supra note 86, at 238 (observing that § 1983 doctrine “imposes diametrically opposite 
liability rules on governmental defendants that are functionally indistinguishable”). 
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Amendment states enjoy sovereign immunity from private litigants’ damages claims.196 In Ex 
parte Young, however, the Court held that private litigants may seek to enjoin state officials from 
undertaking unconstitutional actions.197 But the relief is limited in that any funds required to 
provide the “equitable restitution” may not come from the state treasury.198  
The state liability line of cases thus offers a mirror-image of the relief-based bifurcation 
regime that I propose—precluding damages liability entirely, while permitting, functionally 
speaking, injunctive relief against the state. Because the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize 
local governments from their constitutional torts, it is difficult to justify a more lenient equitable 
relief standard because an adequate alternative remedy may (should) be available, i.e., damages. 
Damages relief may be made more feasible by not subjecting monetary claims to the same 
standards that have historically been imposed where equitable relief is sought, the very same high 
standards raised in Rizzo that permeate the reasoning of Monell and its progeny. 
3. Legislative history 
It may be argued that a bifurcated regime favoring damages claims over those seeking 
equitable remedies runs counter to the legislative intentions that led to the 1871 Act. One of the 
primary concerns that motivated the earlier version of § 1983 was inaction on the part of southern 
law enforcement officials in response to private acts of violence against African Americans. Yet, 
as David Jacks Achtenberg persuasively argues, the 42nd Congress was not averse to expansive 
damages relief against local governments, including through vicarious liability and respondeat 
superior.199 To be sure, injunctive relief might appear the more effective and responsive remedy 
in compelling local law enforcement to protect victims of racist violence. But notwithstanding 
Justice Douglas’s account in Kenosha, nothing in the Act’s legislative history precludes bifurcating 
liability based on relief, nor should it necessarily favor equitable relief over damages relief 
standards.  
Finally, as Michael Gerhardt argues, the Court has crafted a § 1983 jurisprudence that more 
closely resembles federal common law, negating the need to mine legislative history consistent 
with a holding.200 Moreover, Michael Wells demonstrates that the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence—
                                                   
196 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 
197 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Jeffries, Jr. & Rutherglen, supra note 124, at 1395-96 (describing Ex parte Young 
as “[t]he case that shunted aside the traditional presumption against equitable relief,” and that its impact “was 
magnified by contemporaneous developments allowing federal courts to issue injunctions when state courts could not 
do so.”) id. at 1396-98 (noting resulting efforts by Congress, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and the Court, e.g., City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, to limit federal court injunctions). 
198 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974). But see id. at 667 (acknowledging that differences between 
permissible and impermissible relief are difficult to discern and that prospective relief permitted under Ex parte Young 
may affect state revenues). 
199 Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 84, at 2197-97, 2203-04; id. at 2203 (arguing that rejection of 
Sherman Act reflected only congressional opposition to “making cities liable for damages resulting, not from the 
conduct of their employees, but rather from racially motivated mob violence occurring within the cities’ boundaries”). 
200 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under 
Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 557-58 (1989). See also Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 84, 
at 2197-97 (concluding that fidelity to “the common law decision-making process” requires the Court to overrule 
Monell). 
Avidan Y. Cover          52 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW ___ [Forthcoming 2018]           October 2, 2017 
29 
 
including on municipal liability—frequently “rel[ies] on policy considerations.”201 The Court’s 
emphasis on federalism concerns, therefore, justifies a bifurcated regime that affords damages 
remedies on a lesser showing of liability than is required for equitable relief, the latter being the 
greater accelerant of overstepping federal courts in areas of local concern. 
D. Calcified Municipal Liability 
 
Forty years of Monell have calcified the opinion into a hardened precedent that the Court 
is unlikely to budge by loosening municipal liability standards or bifurcating relief.202 The Court 
has proved itself reliably opposed to expanding constitutional tort liability, shutting the door 
repeatedly on loosening the bounds of qualified immunity or expanding federal causes of action.203 
Taken together, these considerations, along with principles of stare decisis, separation of powers, 
and, of course, federalism, render it near-delusionary to expect the Court to revisit its municipal 
liability jurisprudence. Accordingly, any bifurcated municipal liability regime will need to usher 
from Congress.204 
 
E. Chief Justice Burger’s Progressive, Legislative Proposal 
While legislation may sometimes emerge from the scrapheap of judicial dicta, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger would appear an unlikely source for a statute affording victims of police brutality 
a realistically obtainable damage remedy against municipalities. But that is largely the framework 
he sketched out in his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau 
of Narcotics, where he objected to the Court’s crafting of a damages remedy for a federal agent’s 
Fourth Amendment violation that Congress had not authorized.205 Though he proposed only a 
federal remedial scheme, Burger hoped that states would adopt similar statutes, all of which 
“would move our system toward more responsible law enforcement.”206 None of this rankled 
Burger’s staunch federalist orientation.207 
                                                   
201 Wells, supra note 5, at 1049 (citing Owen, 445 U.S. at 638-50; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982)). 
202 See Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma, supra note 167, at 1631 (“[T]he Court will hesitate to 
embrace any development aimed at facilitating constitutional tort litigation.”). 
203 Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843. 
204 See Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma, supra note 167, at, 1629 n. 146 (“Immunity doctrine has 
been primarily the subject of judicial development, but its contours do not appear to be constitutionally compelled. 
Congress would thus appear to have substantial power to legislate on the question of official immunity and it has 
occasionally done so.”) If not “near-delusional,” it may strike some readers as farcical to expect anytime soon that 
Congress will legislate at all, let alone in the realm of police accountability. The 115th Congress appears on pace, or 
maybe even a bit behind, the past few Congress’ record-breaking low number of enacted laws. See Statistics and 
Historical Comparison: Bills by Final Status, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (accessed 
Aug. 9, 2017); Norm Ornstein, Is this the Worst Congress Ever?, THE ATLANTIC, May 17, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/is-this-the-worst-congress-ever/483075/ (accessed Aug. 9, 
2017); Jonathan Topaz, ‘Worst Congress Ever’: By the Numbers, POLITICO, Dec. 17, 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/congress-numbers-113658 (accessed Aug. 9, 2017). 
205 403 U.S. at 422–24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
206 Id. at 424. 
207 See James L. Volling, Warren E. Burger: An Independent Pragmatist Remembered, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
39, 47 (1996) (describing “hallmark of Warren Burger’s judicial philosophy” as “seeking jurisprudential equipoise 
through common-sense weighing of competing interests in the context of federalism.”). 
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Writing during the interim between Monroe and Monell, Burger called on Congress to 
enact a “remedy against the government itself to afford compensation and restitution” to police 
misconduct victims.208 Observing that lawsuits against individual officers had not proven effective 
at stemming police misconduct, Burger’s statute waives sovereign immunity, adheres to 
respondeat superior principles, applies to both police intentional and negligent wrongdoing, 
encompasses error and intentional wrongdoing by officers, and vests jurisdiction in a specialized 
tribunal.209  
To be sure, Burger felt any such remedy was outside the Court’s creative power, as 
reflected in Bivens210 and later in his joining the dissent in Monell. Yet he envisioned that the 
judiciary would have “the ultimate responsibility for determining and articulating standards” in his 
remedial scheme.211  
The congressional response to Burger’s proposal and Bivens was mixed. Congress 
amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to substitute the United States as “generally liable on a 
simple respondeat superior theory for the common law torts of its employees.”212 But Congress 
declined to enact possible United States liability for constitutional violations.213 Today, the need 
for congressionally authorized local police accountability through expanded compensation is even 
more pronounced. 
IV. A NEW MUNICIPAL LIABILITY DAMAGES STANDARD 
This Part sketches out the details of a new statutory provision for purposes of obtaining 
damages relief against local governments and entities. The proposal builds off § 14141, § 1983 
case law, and the interaction between qualified immunity and municipal liability doctrines. The 
proposed statutory framework would by and large remove the need for litigants to meet the strict 
definitions of “policy” and “policymaker” or demonstrate “deliberate indifference” or “moving 
force” causation in failure to train, prevent, and discipline claims. 
                                                   
208 403 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger’s proposal also would have required that the misconduct at issue 
be included within the “officer’s personnel file so that the need for additional training or disciplinary action could be 
identified or his future usefulness as a public official evaluated.” Id. at 423. 
209 Id. at 421-24. 
210 Id. at 412 (“Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task—as 
we do not.”). 
211 Id. at 423. Burger also preferred the damages remedy to the suppression doctrine as a limitation on police 
misconduct, noting the potential “meaningful redress” for victims rather than letting criminals go free. Id. at 424. 
While sympathetic to the innocent victim, his proposal would have undone criminal defendants’ protections 
established pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Burger’s proposal would have required that no evidence be excluded 
from a criminal proceeding on the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 423. 
212 FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 138, at 1090 (emphasis in original); Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort 
Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA 
essentially immunizes individual officers from common law tort claims, however. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006) 
(“The remedy against the United States . . . for injury . . . arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive 
of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages.”). 
213 James E. Pfander & David Baltmandis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. 
L. J. 117, 123 (2009). 
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A. The Statutory Framework 
Under the proposed framework, municipal liability meriting damages relief for police 
misconduct may be demonstrated in two different ways. In addition, the proposal expands 
individual officer liability in certain circumstances.  
(1) Pattern or Practice Liability. A person may in a civil action obtain appropriate damages 
relief from the relevant local government authority when:  
(a) the person has been subjected to a constitutional harm (deprivation of rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States) by the local government’s law enforcement officers; and  
(b) the constitutional harm is part of a pattern or practice of conduct by the local 
government’s law enforcement officers. 
 
(2) Lack of Policy Liability. A person may in a civil action obtain appropriate damages 
relief from the relevant local government authority when:  
(a) the person has been subjected to a constitutional harm;  
(b) the local government authority has a duty to prevent the harm, as evidenced through 
a generally (national) accepted norm, policy, or custom aimed at preventing the harm;  
(c) the local government authority lacks a policy preventing the harm; and  
(d) the harm is a foreseeable consequence of the lack of policy.  
(e) The local government authority may not be held liable for damages if it shows that 
the lack of policy did not cause the constitutional harm. 
 
(3) Notice of Constitutional Right. The existence of a local government authority policy 
aimed at preventing a constitutional harm provides notice to any of the local 
government’s law enforcement officers of the prohibition and “clearly establishes” a 
constitutional right against such harms for purposes of § 1983 civil actions. 
 
1. Pattern or Practice Liability 
Section 1 of the legislative proposal largely tracks the language and reasoning of § 14141. 
A local government should be held responsible for a specific constitutional harm that an individual 
officer perpetrates when the same types of constitutional harms have been perpetrated in the past 
by the local government’s officers. The local government’s failure to prevent repeated harms 
amounts to—at the minimum—acquiescence or tacit approval—and should therefore constitute a 
“policy or custom” for purposes of securing local government liability and a damages remedy. The 
lack of any specific order or directive by a policymaker is immaterial. Conceiving of a pattern or 
practice, i.e., what actually happens, as a de facto “policy” accords with Peter Schuck’s observation 
that “low-level, bottom-up processes” and “street-level bureaucrats” frequently determine 
policy.214 
                                                   
214 Schuck, supra note 64, at 1778 (quoting Richard Weatherley & Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and 
Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 171, 172 (1977)). 
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Critical questions may arise concerning this avenue for municipal damages relief. First, 
when does a harm rise to the frequency of a pattern or practice? Addressing § 1983 actions, the 
Supreme Court has held that “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained 
employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure 
to train.”215 In the § 14141 context, the DOJ contends that a pattern or practice requires “repeated 
and not isolated instances” of constitutional violations.216 But, the DOJ qualifies, a court need not 
find a “specific number of incidents” or be shown “statistical evidence” to find a pattern or 
practice.217 Relying on International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, concerning Title 
VII employment discrimination government, the DOJ explains that the phrase “‘was not intended 
as a term of art,’ but should be interpreted according to its usual meaning ‘consistent with the 
understanding of the identical words’ used in other federal civil rights statutes.”218  
This broad definition in the § 14141 context has been subject to little judicial review,219 
but a capacious basis for municipal damages liability may elicit resistance. Courts have struggled 
in the § 1983 arena over what number of past violations would put local government officials on 
notice such that municipal liability should attach for the entity’s inaction.220 In Connick v. 
Thompson, four members of the Court would have held that four instances of Brady violations in 
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office resulting in overturned convictions amount to a 
pattern and constitutes notice for purposes of assessing foreseeability, deliberate indifference, and 
failure to train.221 But the majority did not address the requisite number of violations for a pattern, 
treating the claim as one based on a single incident.222 The ultimate question of how many 
instances amounts to a pattern or practice may necessarily be left for courts to determine. 
Equally challenging under the present proposal is defining the scope of constitutional 
harms within a pattern or practice. The Justices disagreed in Connick over what degree of similarity 
is required between the prior misconduct and the underlying constitutional harm. The majority 
discounted the pattern of preceding Brady violations because they did not involve—as was at issue 
in the case—“failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or scientific 
evidence of any kind.”223 In contrast, the dissenters took a broader view of a pattern of 
unconstitutional conduct, contending that the fact of the prior Brady violations should have alerted 
the prosecutor’s office to the foreseeability of the office’s unlawful secret retention of crime lab 
                                                   
215 Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 409). 
216 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 12 
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf (citing Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n. l6 (1977)) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT]. The Teamsters opinion, however, elsewhere 
describes a “pattern or practice” as “standard operating procedure—the regular, rather than the unusual practice.” 431 
U.S. at 336.  
217 DOJ REPORT, supra note 216, at 12 (citing Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1265 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (Title VII); United States v. W. Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) 
218 Id. (quoting Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n. 16). 
219 See supra Part II, (discussing cases addressing pattern or practice). 
220 WASSERMAN, supra note 88, at 132-33. 
221 563 U.S. at 104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
222 Id. at 62. 
223 Id. at 62-63. 
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evidence.224 Thus, here too, courts will need to determine the requisite degree of similarity between 
prior instances of unconstitutional violation and the specific harm a plaintiff alleges. Though given 
the proposed statute’s expanded remedial intentions, courts should incline toward finding a similar 
relationship between constitutional harms and prior violations, departing from the currently 
limiting municipal liability doctrine associated with foreseeability and fault tests.225 
Definitional concerns aside, plaintiffs also may encounter evidentiary or informational 
challenges in prosecuting pattern or practice claims. It may be difficult for claimants—particularly 
low-income individuals—to obtain sufficient documentation of prior misconduct in order to satisfy 
pleadings standards to establish a pattern or practice. These hurdles are present, of course, in 
current § 1983 municipal liability litigation as well, but should be partly ameliorated by more 
generous interpretations of the scope and number of preceding constitutional violations. Plaintiffs 
also may, of course avail themselves of § 14141-related reports and findings to support their own 
pattern or practice damages claims.226 
2. Lack of Policy Liability 
Under the “lack of policy liability” provision, municipalities may be liable for damages for 
even single instances of officer misconduct when they lack generally accepted police department 
policies aimed at preventing the particular constitutional harm at issue. This section holds liable 
those police departments that do not meet the standards of most other police departments, thereby 
recognizing a constitutional duty to prevent certain police misconduct.227 In addition to securing 
compensation, this feature is the most likely to encourage departments to adopt nationally 
recognized, constitutional police policies and practices in order to avoid future liability.  
The provision removes the high causation standard that proves so difficult for many 
plaintiffs to surmount when no appropriate policy is in effect. A lack of relevant policy thus 
amounts to what is a presumption of municipal liability. Though a municipality may demonstrate 
that the absence of a policy did not cause the plaintiff’s constitutional harm, that burden is on the 
municipal government, not the plaintiff. Plaintiffs may still obtain damages when police 
departments have implemented appropriate policies but will not benefit from the same favorable 
municipal liability standard of proof. 
The notion of a constitutional duty to prevent police misconduct has not eluded judicial 
review. In Rizzo the Court rejected imposing a negligence standard, replete with a duty of care, on 
local government and police officials. The Court discounted the contention that government 
                                                   
224 Id. at 103-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
225 WASSERMAN, supra note 88, at 132-33. 
226 Rachel Harmon notes in her criticism of proposals according private individuals power to bring equitable claims 
under § 14141 that they may interfere with, or even undermine, government initiated attempts at reform of the same 
police departments. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 103, at 60-62. A significant increase in damages 
claims concerning a department subject to structural reform investigation or oversight could raise some of these same 
concerns though the distinct forms of relief might render the critique largely inapposite.  
227 See Cover, supra note 3, at 1836 (proposing that lack of constitutionally protective policies and training should 
establish municipal liability). 
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defendants had “a constitutional ‘duty’ . . . to ‘eliminate’ future police misconduct.”228 This 
legislation would rectify the Court’s error. 
The proposed standard accords, in part, however, with Justice Blackmun’s articulation of 
constitutional duty. Blackmun argued in his dissent in Rizzo for a more expansive reading of 
§ 1983 liability as described in Monroe: Section 1983 “‘should be read against the background of 
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.’”229 Even 
without a specific policy ordering the constitutional violations, Blackmun insisted that “[t]here 
must be federal relief available against persistent deprival of federal constitutional rights.”230 As 
Blackmun explained, police officials may have a “duty” to prevent subordinate officer’s 
misconduct, rendering them liable under § 1983.231 
While Blackmun’s opinion directly supports a constitutional duty to prevent police 
misconduct when a pattern or practice of constitutional violations exists, his reasoning indirectly 
supports a constitutional duty where there is a general police policy and practice to prevent 
particular constitutional violations. A national consensus on such policies reflects an informed 
belief that a police department must take specific steps and implement certain procedures to 
prevent constitutional violations by its officers.  
Resort to a consensus of local police department practices to ascertain a constitutional 
standard or duty of care may be analogized to the medical malpractice national standard of care.232 
Commentators justify the trend toward a national medical standard as preventing substandard 
medical treatment and ensuring quality care irrespective of diverse geographic locations.233 
Adopting such national standards of police treatment may be justified on similar grounds. 
                                                   
228 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 376 (“Such reasoning . . . blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language in a way 
which would be quite inconsistent with the words Congress chose in s 1983.” Notably, all of the cases that the Court 
addressed relating to a link between a pattern of misconduct involved pleas for injunctive relief. Id. at 373-77. 
229 Id. at 384 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187). Peter Schuck similarly argues that, in 
addressing municipal liability, the analysis would be better aimed at questions of duty—as to what and whom—rather 
than causation. Schuck, supra note 64, at 1765, 1766-72. 
230 423 U.S. at 382 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun would have held that a supervising official’s conscious 
permission of a subordinate’s constitutional violation could establish liability and lead to an equitable remedy, 
suggesting there was no legal difference between officials’ “active encouragement and direction of” and “mere 
acquiescence in” police misconduct. Id. at 385 n. 2 (quoting Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 
1969)). 
231 Id. (quoting Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969)). 
232 JAMES A. HENDERSON JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON, & DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, THE TORTS PROCESS 213 (8TH ED. 2012) 
(citations omitted) (“The trend in recent years has been to depart from the ‘locality rule’ and to turn to the country as 
a whole to determine medical custom, at least with respect to specialists.”); Michelle Huckaby Lewis, John K. 
Gohagan, & Daniel J. Merenstein, The Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local Medical Practice vs the 
National Standard of Care, 297 JAMA 2633, 2634 (2007) (documenting that 29 states and District of Columbia follow 
a national standard of care) 
233 Lewis at al., supra note 232, at 2636 (noting equal informational access for rural and urban doctors and that 
“persistence of [the locality] rule may serve to promote the practice of substandard medicine”). Compare HENDERSON 
JR. ET AL., supra note 232, at 214 (“The rejection of the locality rule is based on the assumption that the quality of 
medical care ought not vary with the geographical area in which the defendant practices.”) with id. (“But as laudable 
as this sentiment is, is tort law really an effective instrument to achieve this end?”). 
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3. Notice of Constitutional Right 
The final section addresses the potential scenario that municipalities will escape damages 
liability where there is no pattern or practice of the constitutional harms at issue and the 
municipality has a policy in effect that meets the general standard. It may prove difficult for 
plaintiffs to establish municipal liability in these circumstances. The section therefore alters 
qualified immunity doctrine to hold that the local government’s applicable policy “clearly 
establishes” the constitutional prohibition on a certain action. As a result, individual officers who 
violate that policy, which is aimed at preventing the constitutional harm, may not claim they lack 
notice under that prong of the clearly established test and therefore merit immunity.234 The 
combination of the “Lack of Policy Liability” section and the instant provision’s restructuring of 
the law may incentivize municipalities to adopt constitutionally compliant policies and more 
appropriately fix blame for constitutional violations.235 Moreover, individual officers will not 
escape liability, ensuring accountability and compensation.236 
B. Potential Objections 
 
1. Modesty 
 
Critics may contend that the proposed statutory framework for enhanced municipal 
damages liability does not go far enough. Based on the revisionist account of municipal liability 
set forth here, a critic may rightly question why the remedy is not to overrule Monell and lift the 
ban on holding municipalities vicariously liable for the acts of their agents. Numerous members 
of the Supreme Courts and scholars have proposed just that. 237   
 
The proposed framework may be defended against the “too-modest”-remedy on several 
grounds. First, the proposal is likely to cover much of the same conduct as would the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, thereby achieving much of the same compensatory objectives. Second, the 
delineations of liability in the proposed framework offer a level of precision that may enable a so-
inclined government entity to better examine and diagnose its constitutional failings, including 
                                                   
234 See Cover, supra note 3, at 1824-30 (describing similar proposal). 
235 This aspect of my proposal is similar to Brandon Garret and Seth Stoughton’s “safe harbor” proposal, which would 
eliminate municipal liability where a department “adopted sound policies” in exchange for “expanded municipal 
liability and a departure from City of Canton v. Harris, for patterns and practices of constitutional violations.” Brandon 
Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 301 (2017). 
236 Of course, given the current state of indemnification practices, it is likely that municipalities will continue to pay 
for their officer’s constitutional wrongs. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912-
913 (2014) (finding local government pay for more than 99% of the costs connected with settlements and judgments 
arising from civil rights lawsuits against police officers). 
237 See Board of the County Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 431-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 
Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 962-63 (2015) (describing general 
consensus that the most critical improvement to § 1983 litigation would be to permit vicarious liability); Jon A. 
Newman, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue them for Money, WASH. POST, June 23, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-a-better-way-to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-
money/2016/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3_story.html (accessed July, 14, 2016) (proposing 
abolishing qualified immunity, adopting local government vicarious liability, and authorizing federal government to 
sue police on victim’s behalf). 
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certain causation questions.238 By contrast, a vicarious liability regime, which holds the 
government entity responsible for all agents’ misdeeds, complicates the introspective and reform-
minded route that seeks to weed out systemic problems. The prospects of police department “self-
help” through litigation, however, despite the proposal’s more detailed bases of liability, may be 
overstated.239  
 
Finally, the proposed framework’s more detailed bases for municipal liability in 
conjunction with its change to qualified immunity doctrine achieve a better balance in apportioning 
blameworthiness than does respondeat superior’s blunter assignment of entity responsibility. The 
proposed framework, notwithstanding a local government’s potential policy and contractual 
reasons for subsequently indemnifying its police officers, more fairly allocates responsibility to 
the wrongdoer, individual or entity, and may foster improved policies and practices.  
 
2. Costs 
More permissive liability standards for § 1983 monetary damages claims would doubtless 
significantly reduce local treasuries. A first response: that is precisely the point. Too many victims 
of police brutality do not receive damages for the abuse they suffer due to police department action 
and inaction. For too long courts have manipulated government immunity doctrines to favor 
concerns over federalism, costs, and over-deterrence over compensating wronged individuals. 
Taking the costs-savings rationale to its most extreme conclusion would not only deny 
compensation to deserving individuals but also erode public trust and deprive society of 
constitutional-rights-clarifying. If the number of police brutality cases stretches judicial resources 
and local funds, it is no answer to preclude damages awards.240 Rather, the solution is to diminish 
the underlying instances of police misconduct. 
Second, while the primary purpose of the proposed framework is to ensure more 
compensation for police abuse victims, dramatically increased damages awards against 
municipalities and officers may achieve the elusive deterrent effect that also undergirds 
constitutional tort litigation. To the consternation of civil rights advocates—and as volumes of law 
reviews attest—§ 1983 litigation has not reduced police misconduct.241 A greater financial penalty 
                                                   
238 Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1061-75 (2015) (describing 
possible informational benefits gleaned from defensive litigation). 
239 Id. at 1082, 1096-97, 1098-1100 (addressing reasons police departments ignore potential insights from litigation). 
240 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[W]hen we automatically close the courthouse door solely 
on this [judicial resources] basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes of 
legally protected interests.”). 
241 See Jeffries, Jr. & Rutherglen, supra note 124, at 1400-06 (reviewing history of damages as constitutional remedy 
and suggesting that context and efficacy of damages should impact its propriety); id. at 1418 (“Whatever the causes, 
it seems clear that damages actions are not a generally effective remedy against abusive and excessive use of force by 
law enforcement.”); Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, supra note 14, at 453-54 (observing that damages 
“success may not create leverage over the involved law enforcement officers and agencies” in part because “municipal 
budgeting practices usually insulate police department budgets from feeling any financial consequences of lawsuit 
payouts.”). 
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might finally make local governments and their communities take notice and insist on internal 
police reform.  
Moreover, the current state of police misconduct litigation already visits substantial costs 
on local governments. Section 14141 litigation requires that local governments expend hundreds 
of millions of dollars in reforms.242 While some research suggests that these costs may offset § 
1983 litigation expenses by reducing police misconduct, an expansion of municipal liability could 
theoretically lead to locally-imposed reforms precluding the need for additional § 1983 lawsuits 
and § 14141 actions.  
Finally, should damages in the aggregate prove intolerable, the proposed framework could 
incorporate a cap on financial awards. Several commenters have suggested that imposing a ceiling 
on monetary relief or categories of misconduct would realize the general objectives of widespread 
damages relief.243 By ensuring that all deserving victims receive some award—albeit potentially 
diminished—a damages cap also would realize the procedural justice and normative objectives of 
constitutional torts litigation. 
3. Federalism  
The proposed framework’s diminished municipal liability threshold will also rankle many 
concerned over federalism.244 Placing more local governments’ police departments before federal 
judges implicates federalism—but in the narrowest sense. As the revisionist account of municipal 
liability demonstrates, an increase in damages lawsuits should not arouse the protracted litigation 
and oversight concerns that animated the Supreme Court’s original invocations of federalism. And 
a possible cap on damages might further blunt these concerns.  
 
In addition, as Fred Smith argues, local governments’ increased authority and power since 
the 1870s, along with a commensurate rise in common law accountability, support changes to 
constitutional tort accountability.245 The same federal-local power disparities and distinctive 
responsibilities are less pronounced today. Reducing municipal liability standards would fall 
within the logical and necessary progression of rising power and attendant liability. 
 
The proposed framework’s “national standard,” however, may also raise its own issues 
concerning federalism and local autonomy. Federally imposing—even if only legislatively—a 
policy on all 18,000 police departments may offend some local policing interests. Softer legislative 
                                                   
242 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 104, at 1406-07; Eric Heisig, Cleveland Officials 
Acknowledge that Tax Increase is the Only Way to Pay for Police Reform, Cleveland.com, July 13, 2016, 
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2016/07/cleveland_officials_acknowledg.html#incart_m-rpt-1 
(accessed July 13, 2016) (describing likely income tax increase in order to pay for federal consent decree police 
reforms). See also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 (noting costs associated with equitable relief in context of lawsuits against 
state officials). 
243 Schuck, supra note 64, at 1785; Smith, supra note 1, at 482-83. 
244 See, e.g., Black v. City of Memphis, 215 F.3d 1325, 2000 WL 687683 *3 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (“To apply 
a less stringent standard would cause municipal liability to collapse into respondent superior liability, thus raising 
serious federalism concerns.”). 
245 Smith, supra note 1, at 485-87. 
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power may instead be exercised that conditions grant money to local government for police 
activities on their adopting federally-identified policies, training, and standards.246  
 
Yet the localized nature of policing is overstated. Most police departments face similar 
concerns regarding use of force, weapons training, patrol tactics, and the like.247 The need and 
virtue of diverse approaches can be accommodated while arriving, in most cases, at agreed-upon 
best police policies and practices.248 For example, a small, rural police department might not have 
reason to adopt the same policies followed by a large, metropolitan agency. In these circumstances, 
the local department could be permitted to “waive” out of that specific, national consensus policy. 
 
Finally, some may criticize deriving a constitutional duty from various police department 
policies as a “tender-hearted desire to tortify the Fourteenth Amendment”, improperly expanding 
constitutional liability.249 Though this provision admittedly broadens constitutional liability, that 
the duty emerges from a consensus of local police forces should allay some federalism concerns.  
 
The proposal bears some hallmarks of “new federalism”—the notion that “[s]tate 
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those 
required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”250 Here, as well, agreement 
between numerous local police agencies could augment federal constitutional protections. 
Establishing a constitutional duty on police misconduct by consensus of local police departments 
is likely more representative, practical and manageable, and attuned to police and local interests 
than through courts’ current, infrequent judicial opining on constitutional standards, without regard 
to police department policies. 
 
Ultimately, however, the Court’s worries over federalism in Monell and thereafter are 
misplaced. And similar concerns elicited by this proposal are also off the mark. Critics’ brief 
should not be with the mechanisms that enforce government and official liability. Rather, as Third 
Circuit Judge John Gibbons explained, “The fourteenth amendment and the civil rights present the 
threat to local authority.”251 That is, the constitutional and statutory system are designed to limit 
                                                   
246 See, e.g., H.R. 5221, “Preventing Tragedies Between Police and Communities Act of 2016” (proposing that local 
governments receiving grants under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program must train police 
officers in, and utilize de-escalation techniques). 
247 See POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, DEFINING MOMENTS FOR POLICE CHIEFS 20 (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf (“One of the strengths of American policing is that we have 
so many diverse agencies. But there are some areas where we are not going to be able to maintain the luxury of agency-
specific practices. This is one of them.”) (quoting COPS Office Director Ron Davis, addressing militarization of 
police). 
248 See, e.g., POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, USE OF FORCE: TAKING POLICING TO A HIGHER STANDARD 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf. The report 
is based on “four national conferences; a survey of police agencies on their training of officers on force issues; field 
research in police agencies in the United Kingdom and here at home; and interviews of police trainers and other 
personnel at all ranks, as well as experts in mental health.” Id. at 1. 
249 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2479 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 332 (1986)). Also potentially problematic is that, for example, use of force policies are not often models of 
clarity, providing confusing or ambiguous guidance.  
250 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 
(1977). 
251 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 223 (Gibbons, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing) 
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state and local government action. Civil rights litigation, facilitated through appropriately 
permissive standards, “merely compounds, or perhaps makes good, that threat.”252 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Supreme Court long ago proclaimed that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives 
an injury.”253 This article modestly proposes that Congress provide that civil rights protection to 
victims of police brutality by better facilitating compensatory damages through reducing municipal 
liability standards for damages claims and holding individual officers accountable for failing to 
comply with constitutionally protective police department policies. This approach will not vitiate 
the borders of local autonomy, but will bolster these communities’ constitutional limitations, and 
hold their governments, leaders, and officials accountable to the Nation’s laws. 
 
It may be the rare case that a damages award sufficiently compensates a victim of police 
brutality. But where justice and accountability for unlawful police practices so often proves 
elusive, it is vital that a toll be properly levied. Without some civil remedy, the public will struggle 
to keep faith in “a government of laws.” Without some identification of wrongdoing and 
wrongdoer, the people will lose confidence in the protections of the Constitution.  
 
                                                   
252 Id. 
253 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
